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ARBITRATION OF JUST CAUSE CLAIMS BENEFITS 
EMPLOYEES WITH DISABILITIES 
Stacy A. Hickox 
 
ABSTRACT 
Employees with disabilities typically rely on the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) for protection against discipline or discharge.  
Arbitration has been viewed with suspicion by civil rights advocates based 
on concerns that arbitrators will not adequately protect the rights of 
employees in disadvantaged groups, including those with disabilities.  This 
review of arbitration awards that determine whether an employer had just 
cause to discharge or discipline employees with disabilities shows that such 
suspicion may be unwarranted.  Under just cause protection, employers carry 
the burden of justifying a discharge, as well as providing notice of conduct 
standards and adhering to past practice.  In addition, arbitrators applying a 
just cause provision will consider other advantageous contractual protections 
as well as mitigating circumstances in reviewing both the justification for the 
discharge and the appropriateness of discharge as the employer’s response.  
These characteristics of arbitrating just cause claims can benefit employees 
with disabilities beyond the relief available under the ADA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
People with disabilities continue to struggle to find and retain 
employment.1  Even if a person with a disability is hired, their position in the 
workforce has been described as “at best, precarious.”2  An employer may 
not be aware of the disability at the time of hire, or the disability may arise 
or worsen after hire.  Consequently, an employer may find reason to 
discharge an employee based on biases or stereotypes associated with the 
disability, or the impact of the impairment on the person’s performance, 
attendance, or workplace safety.  Employees typically turn to the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) to challenge a discharge based on their 
disability, which may include invocation of an affirmative obligation to 
provide reasonable accommodation that may provide an employee with 
additional protection against discharge.  Some have expressed concern that 
if an employee with a disability is required to arbitrate claims related to her 
dismissal, she will lose out on protections against discrimination, particularly 
those included in the ADA.  This review of 160 arbitration awards shows 
that just cause provisions, whether under a collective bargaining agreement 
or an exception to employment at will, provide employees with disabilities 
with significantly more protection than the ADA alone provides. 
This analysis of the benefits of just cause protection for employees with 
disabilities is important for several reasons.  First, a comparison of these 
awards to outcomes in analogous ADA decisions helps to answer the 
question of whether arbitrators are adequately equipped to resolve claims 
 
 1.  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TABLE A-6.  EMPLOYMENT 
STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION BY SEX, AGE, AND DISABILITY STATUS, NOT 
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED (2017). 
 2.  Carrie Basas, A Collective Good: Disability Diversity as a Value in Public Sector 
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 793, 799, 801 (2013). 
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that would otherwise arise under the ADA and other non-discrimination 
statutes.  Courts regularly defer to arbitration as the forum to enforce 
statutory rights as well as contractual rights.3  This deference is based on the 
assumptions that arbitrators are “capable of handling the difficult factual and 
legal issues that might be raised in a discrimination claim,” and that 
arbitration “would not interfere with the fair resolution of employment 
discrimination claims.”4  In contrast to these assumptions, others have 
warned that arbitration of statutory claims would result in statutes like the 
ADA becoming “dead letters for unionized employees.”5  This analysis of 
just cause claims by employees with disabilities tests the viability of 
arbitration as an alternative venue to resolve discrimination claims, as 
compared to just cause claims by employees without disabilities and 
analogous claims resolved by the courts under the ADA. 
Just cause protection can result from the coverage of a collective 
bargaining agreement or from protections extended by an employer as an 
exception to employment at will.  In either circumstance, just cause 
protections will likely be first interpreted and applied by an arbitrator.  One 
general advantage of relying on just cause protection rather than the ADA 
alone stems from the long-recognized dilemma faced by any ADA plaintiff 
to show that she has a disability, i.e., a substantial limitation of a major life 
activity, but at the same time remains qualified to perform the essential job 
duties of her position.6  Under a just cause provision, a grievant need not 
prove that she has a disability as defined by the ADA; instead, the employee 
can simply present evidence showing a lack of just cause by establishing her 
ability to perform the job if reasonable accommodations are provided. 
Some also argue that just cause protection leads employers to avoid 
hiring “risky” employees, thus adversely affecting people who are protected 
against but most vulnerable to discrimination.7  Since this risk aversion 
behavior could extend to employees with disabilities identified during the 
hiring process, it is important to examine whether the just cause protection 
provides a benefit to employees with disabilities that would justify this 
 
 3.  14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 270-74 (2009); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 
(1991). 
 4.  Sarah Rudolph Cole, Let the Grand Experiment Begin: Pyett Authorizes Arbitration 
of Unionized Employees’ Statutory Discrimination Claims, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
861, 869 (2010).  
 5.  Alan Hyde, Labor Arbitration of Discrimination Claims After 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett: 
Letting Discrimination Defendants Decide Whether Plaintiffs May Sue Them, 25 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 975, 984 (2010).   
 6.  Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 
GA. L. REV. 27, 102-03 (2000). 
 7.  Julie C. Suk, Discrimination At Will: Job Security Protections and Equal 
Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 97 (2007). 
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otherwise potentially adverse effect on them during the hiring process. 
This review of arbitration awards also demonstrates how some general 
principles applied to the interpretation of just cause provisions can benefit 
employees with disabilities.  First, the placement of the burden of proving 
just cause on the employer can have a significant impact on the outcome of 
the challenge to an employee’s discharge.  In contrast, an ADA plaintiff 
carries the burden to establish that she is a person with a disability but that 
she was also otherwise qualified to perform the duties of the position at the 
time of her discharge, and that any accommodation is reasonable. 
Beyond the burden of proof, certain characteristics inherent in the 
arbitration of just cause claims can have significant benefits for employees 
with disabilities.  First, general requirements that an employee be provided 
with notice of required and prohibited behavior as well as an expectation that 
the discharge should align with the employer’s past practice can benefit an 
employee with a disability.  Second, an arbitrator interpreting a just cause 
provision will consider other contractual obligations on an employer in 
deciding whether the discharge of an employee with a disability was 
justified.  Beyond specific contractual requirements, an arbitrator may also 
consider an employer’s more general interests or aggravating circumstances 
that might support a finding of just cause, but an employee with a disability 
also benefits from an arbitrator’s consideration of mitigating circumstances.  
A showing of just cause may be undermined by the link between the 
employee’s disability and the reason for the discharge, as well as 
consideration of the employee’s other characteristics, such as longevity with 
the employer. 
Lastly, this review of arbitration awards considers the benefits of 
flexibility in fashioning the remedies in an award interpreting a just cause 
provision.  A court interpreting the ADA is limited to the question of whether 
the employer discriminated, and if so, whether reinstatement, back pay and 
other damages should follow.8  In contrast, an arbitrator applying a just cause 
provision can change a discharge to a suspension, or award reinstatement 
without back pay, where the grievant is somewhat at fault but the employer 
lacked just cause for her discharge.  In addition, an arbitrator can order 
various conditions or requirements on the employee seeking reinstatement, 
which can help resolve an employer’s concerns about the grievant’s return 
to work.  Thus, this review demonstrates that arbitration of claims under a 
just cause standard can benefit employees with disabilities in ways that they 
would never enjoy under the ADA. 
 
 8.  For example, EEOC’s 2016 report shows $131 million in monetary damages, but 
does not report on the number of reinstatements or other nonmonetary settlements.  U.S. 
EQUAL EMPL’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (ADA) 
CHARGES (CHARGES FILED WITH EEOC) (2016). 
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I.     BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT 
Over its 25-year span, the ADA has been disappointing in its impact on 
employment opportunities for people with disabilities.  Studies have found 
that the passage of the ADA led to a decrease in employment of people with 
disabilities, compared to the employment of nondisabled men.9  The labor 
force participation rate for persons with a disability was 21.0% in October 
2017, compared to a participation rate of 68.3% for people without a 
disability;10 likewise, people with disabilities average an unemployment rate 
of 11.5%, compared to an unemployment rate of 4.7% among persons with 
no disability.11  Labor force participation rates for individuals with certain 
disabilities, such as mental illness, are even lower.12  Likewise, the 
unemployment rates for people with a disability (9.1%) are almost three 
times higher than unemployment rates (averaging 3.8%) for the non-disabled 
with similar disparities across all educational attainment groups.13 
Employers may be reluctant to hire people with disabilities for a variety 
of reasons, including the expected cost of accommodations, a lack of 
awareness as to how to deal with employees with disabilities, and the fear of 
potential litigation by employees who are later disciplined or discharged.14  
Other slightly less common reasons for failing to retain people with 
disabilities include concerns over the need for more extensive supervision, 
other additional costs, as well as unreliable performance and attendance.15  
Along with these work-related concerns, attitudes and discrimination are the 
most frequently reported barriers to inclusion of disabled people in the 
workplace; in fact, many disability rights advocates believe that negative 
social attitudes underlie the disproportionate unemployment and under-
 
 9.  Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? 
The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 917 (2001); Thomas 
DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 J. 
HUM. RESOURCES 693, 694 (2000). 
 10.  U.S. Dep’t of Labor Statistics, supra note 1. 
 11.  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TABLE A.  EMPLOYMENT 
STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN AND NONINSTITUTIONAL POPULATION BY DISABILITY STATUS AND 
AGE, 2015 AND 2016 ANNUAL AVERAGES (2017), available at https://www.bls.gov/news.rele
ase/disabl.a.htm [https://perma.cc/2VHB-XW9C].  
 12.  Judith A. Cook, Employment Barriers for Persons with Psychiatric Disabilities: 
Update of a Report for the President’s Commission, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1391, 1391-
92 (2006). 
 13.  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL-17-0857, PERSONS 
WITH A DISABILITY: LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS – 2016 (2017). 
 14.  H. Stephen Kaye et al., Why Don’t Employers Hire and Retain Workers with 
Disabilities?, 21 J. OCCUPATIONAL REHABILITATION 526, 528-29 (2011). 
 15.  Id. 
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employment of people with disabilities.16 
The ADA was enacted in large part to improve the labor market 
participation of people with disabilities  and to address some of these barriers 
to employment.17  Unfortunately, the ADA has not been particularly 
successful in achieving these goals.  While some have disputed whether the 
ADA’s adoption had a direct negative effect on the employment 
opportunities of people with disabilities,18 as outlined above, there is no 
question that barriers to employment continue to exist for this group.  One 
reason for the ADA’s lack of positive impact stems from the fact that 
plaintiffs have been largely unsuccessful in litigation against employers to 
enforce their rights under the ADA, with win rates as low as 3%.19  This lack 
of success mirrors plaintiffs’ difficulty in successfully litigating any 
employment–related claim, in which only about 5% of claims proceed to trial 
(as opposed to pre-trial dismissal or settlement), and less than 30% of claims 
proceeding to trial result in a judgment for the employee.20  In comparison, 
employees’ win rates in mandatory arbitration are estimated at about 21%.21  
As Justice Harry Edwards has noted, an employee claiming discrimination 
is better off in arbitration because the process is quicker, less costly, and 
lacks the procedural barriers of the courts.22 
For this reason, this paper explores the potential for just cause 
protection to advance the interests of employees with disabilities.  The role 
of just cause protection for employees with disabilities has received little 
 
 16.  Sally Lindsay, Discrimination and Other Barriers to Employment for Teens and 
Young Adults with Disabilities, 33 DISABILITY AND REHABILITATION 1340, 1341 (2011). 
 17.  Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme 
Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 
522 (2008). 
 18.  Christine Jolls & J.J. Prescott, Disaggregating Employment Protection: The Case of 
Disability Discrimination 3, 20-23 (Harvard Law Sch., Working Paper No. 106, 2005), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=580741 [https://perma.cc/DFK4-CA8Y]. 
 19.  Amy L. Albright, 2006 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I – Survey 
Update, 31 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 328, 328 (2007); Sharona Hoffman, 
Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 305, 306 (2008).  
 20.  Theodore Eisenberg, Four Decades of Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 12 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 4, 11 (2015). 
 21.  Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC: 
MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF THEIR RIGHTS, 
Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper #414 (2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-
arbitration-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/6KWZ-UBLT].  Mandatory arbitration procedures 
have become increasingly popular since 1991.  See id. (listing major corporations using 
mandatory arbitration procedures).  
 22.  Harry T. Edwards, Advantages of Arbitration Over Litigation: Reflections of a 
Judge, in ARBITRATION 1982, CONDUCT OF THE HEARING, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH 
ANNUAL MEETING, NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 16, 24 (James L. Stern & Barbara D. 
Dennis eds., 1983). 
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attention in literature on arbitration or the advancement of the rights of those 
employees.  For example, in a treatise of over 500 pages on just cause, only 
five pages are devoted to reasonable accommodations for the employees with 
disabilities.23  This paper highlights the role that arbitration of just cause 
claims can play in advancing the employment opportunities of people with 
disabilities. 
II.    JUST CAUSE PROTECTION 
The resolution of just cause claims through arbitration has significant 
potential to benefit employees with disabilities.  Compared to a court or a 
unilateral decision by an employer, an arbitrator arguably can consider the 
interests of both the employer and the employee with a disability in 
reviewing both the basis for the discipline and potential changes in the 
workplace to improve future performance.  At the same time, the rights of 
employees with disabilities could be severely diminished, given the Supreme 
Court’s deference to arbitration, if arbitrators cannot or will not appropriately 
apply both contractual rights and the ADA to claims invoking just cause 
protection. 
Just cause has been criticized as “difficult for employers to prove,” 
making the resolution process inefficient and vulnerable to second-guessing 
of the employer’s business decisions by the arbitrator.24  Some have argued 
that employers spend “large sums of money” to resolve just cause claims in 
arbitration; in the alternative, employers offer “large, and often undeserved, 
severance payments” or even retain unproductive employees.25 Economists 
have shown that exceptions to employment at-will, including just cause 
protection, are associated with an increase of labor expenses and have a 
negative effect on profitability, just as wrongful-discharge laws impose costs 
on employers.26 
Without just cause protection, the presumption of employment at-will 
means that “many truly egregious terminations are left unremedied.”27  The 
employment-at-will doctrine can result in “substantial levels of uncertainty 
for employers and employees alike.”28  At-will employees who have been 
 
 23.  ADOLPH M. KOVEN & SUSAN L. SMITH, JUST CAUSE: THE SEVEN TESTS 421-26 (BNA 
ed., 3d ed. 2006). 
 24.  Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will 
Employment and Just Cause, 87 NEB. L. REV. 62, 64 (2008). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Robert C. Bird & John D. Knopf, Do Wrongful-Discharge Laws Impair Firm 
Performance?, 52 J. L. & ECON. 197, 218 (2009). 
 27.  Porter, supra note 25, at 63. 
 28.  Timothy J. Coley, Contracts, Custom, and the Common Law: Towards a Renewed 
Prominence for Contract Law in American Wrongful Discharge Jurisprudence, 24 B.Y.U. J. 
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discharged are left to rely on anti-discrimination statutes, including the 
ADA,29 leading to an over-reliance on these statutes to protect against unjust 
discharges.30 
The impact of just cause protection illustrates both its benefits for 
employees and its role in reducing uncertainty for both employers and 
employees.  These arguments in favor of some form of just cause protection 
have led to widespread adoption of just cause provisions in collective 
bargaining agreements (CBAs)31 as well as some voluntary incorporation of 
exceptions to employment at-will in employer policies and procedures.  
Under either a CBA or an employer policy, just cause protection is often 
accompanied by a mandatory arbitration program.32  The potential for 
protecting employees with disabilities under a just clause provision may 
explain the observation that allegations of disability discrimination are 
presented in the grievance and arbitration system more often than other 
forms of discrimination.33  For this reason, it is important to understand what 
is meant by just cause and how such protection is adopted as part of a CBA 
or arises as an exception to employment at-will. 
A. What is Just Cause? 
The just cause standard has been characterized as “inexact,”34 and at 
least one arbitrator has noted that it “cannot be seen in an absolute sense.”35  
A determination of whether an employer had just cause to discharge an 
employee depends upon numerous factors related to both the specific event 
leading to the discharge and the length and quality of the employee’s work 
record, as well as the circumstances surrounding the promulgation and past 
enforcement of the policy in question.36  Just cause analysis allows for review 
of the appropriateness of discharge as the penultimate level of discipline, in 
that a penalty must not be excessive, and must be corrective or progressive 
unless the conduct justifies discharge for a first offense.37 
 
PUB. L. 193, 194 (2010). 
 29.  Steven E. Abraham, The Arizona Employment Protection Act: Another “Wrongful 
Discharge Statute” That Benefits Employers?, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 105 (2008). 
 30.  Porter, supra note 25, at 76. 
 31.  See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS, at 7, 127 
(14th ed. 1995) (discussing grounds for discharge and prohibitions on discrimination). 
 32.  For further explanation, see infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text. 
 33.  KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 423. 
 34.  Id. at 4. 
 35.  Indal Aluminum Gulfport, 84 Lab. Arp. Rep. (BNA) 124, 127 (1985) (Nicholas, 
Arb.). 
 36.  THE COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE: THE VIEWS OF ARBITRATORS 184-187 
(Theodore J. St. Antoine ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
 37.  Id. 
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A review of arbitration awards, which apply just cause provisions and 
sometimes applicable statutes to employees with disabilities, demonstrates a 
wide variation in how much the ADA influences how just cause is 
interpreted.  Just cause protections against discipline and discharge are 
commonly found in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) as well as 
some employee handbooks.  Arbitration awards apply just cause protections 
based on traditional contract interpretation principles as well as arbitrators’ 
interpretations of applicable statutes, where the arbitrator has the authority 
and the inclination to apply them.  The outcomes in these awards often 
compare favorably to judicial outcomes under various nondiscrimination and 
other protective statutes. 
This analysis will help to answer the question of whether barriers to 
continued employment can be addressed through collective bargaining and 
arbitration.  More broadly, this review will illustrate whether arbitrators are 
equipped to resolve grievances so as to help remove barriers to continued 
employment for employees with disabilities and other barriers to 
employment while still interpreting and applying the collective bargaining 
agreement between the employer and union. 
1. Just Cause in CBAs 
Just cause protection against discipline or discharge is one of the most 
widely recognized benefits of representation by a labor union in the United 
States.38  As of 2011, nearly 16.3 million employed workers were covered 
by CBAs,39 most of which require just cause for discipline or discharge, and 
provide for interpretation of that protection through a grievance process and 
final adjudication before a neutral arbitrator.40  Such protection creates an 
important exception to employment at-will for employees who are covered 
by a CBA.  Some arbitrators recognize protection from unjust dismissal even 
in contracts that do not contain an explicit “just cause” provision, because 
such protection is so integral to the collective bargaining relationship.41  One 
 
 38.  See KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 15-17 (describing the role of just cause in 
collective bargaining relationship). 
 39.  See Mario F. Bognanno, et al., The Conventional Wisdom of Discharge Arbitration 
Outcomes and Remedies: Fact or Fiction, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 153, 153-54 
(2014) (citing U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at http://www.bls.gov.proxy2.cl.m
su.edu/cps/cpsaat40.htm [https://perma.cc/4HS7-325D]). 
 40.  See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 32, at 7, 127 (discussing discharge 
procedures and prohibitions on discrimination). 
 41.  FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS (The Bureau 
of National Affairs, Inc., 5th ed. 1997) at 886-87; see, e.g., J & J Maint., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. 
(BNA) 847, 855 (2005) (Henderson, Arb.) (showing presence of an arbitration clause is an 
important event pointing toward implicit “just cause” protection); Superior Prods., 116 Lab. 
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1623, 1626 (2002) (Hockenberry, Arb.); Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 114 Lab. 
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arbitrator went so far as to state that a failure to recognize an implied just 
cause protection would be “unconscionable,” even where the employer has 
reserved discretion to impose discipline; without it, employers would hold 
“an unlimited right to decide any issue concerning employees’ job security 
without a challenge,” thereby compromising “the integrity of the bargaining 
unit,” and would “nullify the seniority and arbitration provisions, and, of 
course, make a mockery of the no strike clause.”42 
Despite the importance of just cause protection, employers can 
sometimes preserve the employment at-will relationship with “clear contract 
language” or based on “unequivocal bargaining history or past practice, . . . 
[or] the special nature of employment” demonstrating the intent of the 
parties.43  Only such “high degree of assurance about intent” will cause an 
arbitrator to “bypass the fairness doctrines associated with the just-cause 
principle.”44  Thus, despite its commonality, just cause protection will not be 
implied where the contract language specifically preserves the at-will 
employment relationship.45 
The widespread inclusion of just cause protection in CBAs suggests that 
both employers and unions value its role.  Such protection produces an 
economically efficient outcome if unionized employees are more willing to 
pay for such protection than employers are willing to pay for an at-will 
relationship.46  The efficiency and overall attractiveness of just cause 
protection for an employer and union may depend upon the composition of 
 
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 358, 358 (2000) (Kaufman, Arb.) (demonstrating that an employer must 
prove that it had just cause to discharge non-probationary employees); Van Waters & Rogers, 
Inc., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep.(BNA) 609, 611 (1993) (Feldman, Arb.) (noting arbitrators 
overwhelmingly imply cause or just cause in the absence of clear and unambiguous language 
that such a standard is not to be considered); Zellerbach Paper Co., 73 Lab. Arb. Rep.(BNA) 
1140, 1142 (1979) (Sabo, Arb.) (“[E]ven where a contract fails to include any general 
limitations as to the right to [d]ischarge, [a]rbitrators have concluded that a just cause 
restriction is implied in modern Collective Bargaining Agreements . . . .”); Gary Minda & 
Katie R. Raab, Time For an Unjust Dismissal Statute in New York, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1137, 
1192-93 (1989) (“[I]f a just cause clause is missing from the agreement, the arbitrator infers 
its existence from the seniority clause or grievance and arbitration provision.”); Kenneth A. 
Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the Model Employment Termination 
Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 849, 910 (1994) (“[M]any arbitrators have inferred the existence of a 
just-cause standard in agreements that did not expressly state such a standard.”). 
 42.  See Theole Asphalt, 129 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 953, 957 (2011) (Baroni, Arb.) 
(explaining that just cause for discipline is an integral part of agreements, unless specifically 
disclaimed). 
 43.  J & J Maint., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 855. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp., 136 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1117, 1123 (2016) (Baroni, 
Arb.) (refusing to imply just cause protection where contract language specifically preserved 
the at-will employment relationship). 
 46.  Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More With Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 
89, 89, 95 (2008). 
HICKOX_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  3:15 PM 
350 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20.2 
 
the workforce and the sense of whether statutory protections are sufficient 
for those employees.  The value of just cause protection highlights the 
important role that labor unions can take in advancing the interests of 
workers with disabilities in particular, by bargaining for and arbitrating just 
cause challenges to discharges and other forms of discipline.47 
2. Just Cause as Employment At Will Exception 
Just cause protections can be seen as an exception to the general 
presumption that employees in the U.S. are “at-will,” meaning that the 
relationship can be terminated by either party at any time for any reason or 
no reason.48  This means that employees are “vulnerable to arbitrary and 
sudden dismissal.”49  In large part because the employment contract is 
typically governed by state law, standards related to discharge have been 
characterized as “numerous, complex, and unnecessarily confusing.”50  This 
makes compliance and enforcement difficult for employers, which is 
troubling given the importance of discharges for both employers and 
employees.51  This variability and instability arguably has introduced “a 
considerable measure of ambiguity and inefficiency into the American labor 
market, both for employers and employees,” which is only exacerbated by 
higher levels of discharges as in a recession.52 
Employers can create an exception to employment at will via a CBA or 
through its own policies by including just cause protection.53  Most states 
will enforce promises in an employee handbook that create an exception to 
employment at will,54 with only six states failing to recognize any such 
 
 47.  See Stacy A. Hickox, Bargaining for Accommodations, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 147, 195-
203 (2016) for further discussion of the benefits of addressing accommodation in contract 
negotiations. 
 48.  Katherine V.W. Stone, Revisiting the At-Will Employment Doctrine: Imposed Terms, 
Implied Terms, and the Normative World of the Workplace, 36 INDUS. L. J. 84, 84 (2007). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Hirsch, supra note 47, at 95. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Coley, supra note 29, at 196. 
 53.  Stone, supra note 49, at 89.  See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 
N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980) (“[W]here an employer chooses to establish [personnel] 
policies and practices and makes them known to its employees, the employment relationship 
is presumably enhanced.”). 
 54.  Bloomberg BNA Individual Employment Rights Law (Analysis), State Rulings 
Chart, http://laborandemploymentlaw.bna.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/lerc/2441/split_display.ad
p?fedfid=2161694&vname=leiermana&fcn=1&wsn=500060000&fn=2161694&split=0; 
see, e.g., Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding 
that the employment at-will principle did not apply when the company had issued a detailed 
employee handbook containing specific grievance procedures). 
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exception.55  To be enforceable, courts typically require that language 
offering just cause protection must be specific, clear and unequivocal.56  Of 
course a disclaimer or other language in an employee handbook can negate 
the binding effect of a just cause provision.57 
 
 55.  Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982); McConnell v. E. Air 
Lines, Inc., 499 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Burgess v. Decatur Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n, 345 S.E.2d 45 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 328 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1975); Stanton v. Tulane Univ. of La., 777 So. 2d 1242 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Johnson v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988). 
 56.  See generally Conley v. Bd. of Trs. of Grenada Cty. Hosp., 707 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 
1983); Zavadil v. Alcoa Extrusions Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (D.S.D. 2005); Smith v. 
Heritage Salmon, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 208 (D. Me. 2002); Caucci v. Prison Health Servs., 
Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 605 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Hoerner v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 98 Civ. 4210, 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2914 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Hines v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 813 F. 
Supp. 550 (W.D. Ky. 1993); Milroy v. K-G Retail Stores, 819 F. Supp. 857 (D. Neb. 1993); 
Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987); Jones v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. 
Hosp., 779 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1989); DeMasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138 (Ariz. 1999); 
Gladden v. Ark. Children’s Hosp., 728 S.W.2d 501 (Ark. 1987); Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 
100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352 (Cal. 2000); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336 (Colo. 
1988); Finley v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 499 A.2d 64 (Conn. Ct. App. 1985), rev’d on other 
grounds, 520 A.2d 208 (Conn. 1987); Sisco v. GSA Nat’l Capital Fed. Credit Union, 689 
A.2d 52 (D.C. 1997); Kinoshita v. Can. Pac. Airlines, 724 P.2d 110 (Haw. 1986); Watson v. 
Idaho Falls Consol. Hosp., Inc., 720 P.2d 632 (Idaho 1986); Janda v. U.S. Cellular Corp., 961 
N.E.2d 425, 440 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); Vaughn v. Ag Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627 (Iowa 
1990); Brown v. United Methodist Homes for the Aged, 815 P.2d 72 (Kan. 1991); Dahl v. 
Brunswick Corp., 356 A.2d 221 (Md. 1976); Hobson v. McLean Hosp. Corp., 522 N.E.2d 
975 (Mass. 1988); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 
1980); Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 2000); Martin v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 899 P.2d 551 (Nev. 1995); Butler v. Walker Power, Inc., 629 A.2d 91 (N.H. 
1993); Nicosia v. Wakefern Food Corp., 643 A.2d 554 (N.J. 1994); Forrester v. Parker, 606 
P.2d 191 (N.M. 1980); Trought v. Richardson, 338 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); 
Osterman-Levitt v. MedQuest, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 70 (N.D. 1994); Mers v. Dispatch Printing 
Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100 (Ohio 1985); Russell v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 952 P.2d 492 (Okla. 
1997); Frazier v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 728 P.2d 87 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); King v. 
PYA/Monarch, 453 S.E.2d 885 (S.C. 1995); Smith v. Morris, 778 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1988); City of Odessa v. Barton, 967 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. 1998); Francisconi v. Union Pac. 
R.R., 36 P.3d 999 (Utah Ct. App. 2001); Taylor v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 466 (Vt. 
1993); Ludwig v. T2 Med., Inc., 34 Va. Cir. 65 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1994); Thompson v. St. Regis 
Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984); Cook v. Heck’s, Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1986); 
Garvey v. Buhler, 430 N.W.2d 616 (Wis. 1988); Alexander v. Phillips Oil Co., 707 P.2d 1385 
(Wyo. 1985).   
 57.  See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-110 (2017) (“It is the public policy of this State 
that a handbook . . . shall not create an express or implied contract of employment if it is 
conspicuously disclaimed.”); Aberle v. City of Aberdeen, 718 N.W.2d 615, 622-23 (S.D. 
2006) (finding “an explicit contractual reservation of the statutory power to terminate an 
employee at will” when the employment contract states that an employer has the right to 
terminate employment at any time); Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1003 
(Utah 1991) (finding against the employee when the manual in question contains clear and 
conspicuous language stating the employer’s intent to maintain an at-will relationship); Suter 
v. Harsco Corp., 403 S.E.2d 751, 754 (W. Va. 1991) (“[T]he court made it clear that 
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Some states’ legislation has recognized the enforceability of a contract 
creating an exception to employment at will,58 and Montana has legislated 
good cause protection for all employees not covered by a CBA or a term 
contract.59  However, even Montana’s statute requiring a “legitimate 
business reason” for discharge has been defined broadly to include “a reason 
that is neither false, whimsical, arbitrary or capricious, and [has] . . . some 
logical relationship to the needs of the business.”60 
An employer may indirectly provide its employees with just cause 
protection by its adoption of an employment arbitration program.61  
Employment arbitration clauses have become increasingly common.62  A 
mandate to arbitrate disputes between the employer and employee can be 
viewed as an exception to employment at will.63  Some employment 
arbitrators, when hearing claims by individual employees, have found an 
implied just cause test where the employer has provided an arbitration 
system to resolve employment disputes.64  Thus, if an employment 
agreement includes a just cause protection against discipline or discharge, 
that agreement may be enforceable through an arbitration system.  If, 
however, the employer has explicitly preserved its right to discharge 
employees without cause, an arbitrator will be unlikely to imply a just cause 
requirement.65 
Even if an employer incorporates some just cause provision into its 
employment contracts, its effectiveness in protecting the interests of 
 
employers could protect themselves by requiring prospective employees to acknowledge that 
they served at the will and the pleasure of the employer.”); Davis v. Wyo. Med. Ctr., 934 P.2d 
1246 (Wyo. 1997). 
 58.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1501 (LexisNexis 2017) (establishing the enforceability of 
contract clauses expressly restricting the right of either party to terminate the employment 
relationship). 
 59.  Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-902 (2017). 
 60.  Buck v. Billings Mont. Chevrolet, Inc., 811 P.2d 537, 538, 540 (Mont. 1991). 
 61.  Koven & Smith, supra note 23, at 31-32. 
 62.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 63.  Stone, supra note 49, at 85. 
 64.  See, e.g., Essroc Materials, 99 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 664, 668 (1992) (Murphy, 
Arb.) (“[I]t is reasonable to imply into the text of [a] special procedure [for discharge] that the 
Employer had ‘just cause’ in order to justify its decision to discharge.”); Alfred M. Lewis, 
Inc., 81 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 621, 624 (1983) (Sabo, Arb.) (“Arbitrators have concluded 
that a Just Cause restriction is implied in modern Collective Bargaining Agreements in the 
absence of a provision to the contrary.”). 
 65.  KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 31.  See, e.g., Raymond James Fin. Servs. v. 
Bishop, 596 F.3d 183, 194-95 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that an arbitration agreement retains 
employer’s ability to discharge at will when expressly stated); Local Union 1393 v. Utils. 
Dist. of W. Ind. Rural Elec. Membership Coop., 167 F.3d 1181, 1185 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding 
no implied just cause requirement when the CBA expressly provides the employer with the 
sole discretion and final authority to terminate). 
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employees may be limited if left to the courts for interpretation.  For 
example, a Wisconsin court determined that even though a hospital had 
agreed to discharge an employee only if the discharge was in the hospital’s 
best interest, the court would not delve into the reasonableness of the 
decision or whether the reasons existed in fact, but limited itself to the 
question of whether the hospital believed that the discharge was in its own 
interest.66  As outlined immediately below, courts also show significant 
deference to arbitrators’ interpretations of just cause provisions. 
B. Judicial Deference to Arbitration Awards 
When considering the role of arbitration in supporting the rights of 
employees with disabilities, it is important to consider the longstanding 
limitations of the courts in reviewing arbitrators’ awards.  Judicial deference 
to arbitration awards occurs in determinations as to whether the employer 
had just cause to impose discipline or discharge under either a CBA67 or an 
individual arbitration agreement.68 
Judicial deference extends to an arbitrator’s determination that an 
arbitration agreement suggests an implied just cause standard.  An 
 
 66.  Hale v. Stoughton Hosp. Ass’n, 376 N.W.2d 89 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985). 
 67.  Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local Union No. 682 v. Thoele Asphalt Paving, Inc., 508 
Fed. Appx. 583, 583 (8th Cir. 2013); SFIC Properties, Inc. v. Machinists, Dist. Lodge 94, 103 
F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that just cause requirements are inferred from all 
modern day CBA’s which do not contain an express provision); Truck Drivers Local 705 v. 
Schrider Tank Lines, 958 F.2d 171, 175 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that an arbitration clause 
implies a just cause requirement); Smith v. Kerrville Bus Co., 709 F.2d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 
1983) (“In instances where the language of a collective contract does not explicitly prohibit 
dismissal except for just cause, arbitrators typically infer such prohibitions from seniority 
clauses or grievance and arbitration procedures.”); Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., v. Liang, 
653 F.2d 310, 312 (7th Cir. 1981) (“It has been held repeatedly that an agreement to arbitrate 
disputes about employee discharges implies a requirement that discharges be only for ‘just 
cause.’”); McCall v. Sw. Airlines Co., No. 3:08-cv-2000-M, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2522 at 
*30 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2010) (“[T]he fact that the CBA allows arbitration of employee 
terminations implies a requirement that discharges be only for ‘just cause.’”); United Food 
and Commercial Workers Int’l v. Gold Star Sausage, 487 F. Supp. 596 (D.C. 1980) (finding 
that the arbitrator is allowed to find that the CBA implied a just cause requirement); see also 
Minda & Raab, supra note 42, at 1192-93 (“[I]f a just cause clause is missing from the 
agreement, the arbitrator infers its existence from the seniority clause or grievance and 
arbitration provision.”); Clyde Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: 
Time For A Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 499-500 (1976) (noting that arbitrators typically infer 
just cause protections from seniority clauses or grievance and arbitration procedures). 
 68.  PaineWebber, Inc. v. Agron, 49 F.3d 347, 352 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding the 
arbitrator’s ruling that discharge was unjustified even though employee was at-will under state 
law); Deluca v. Bear Stearns & Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 102, 111 (D. Mass. 2001) (finding that 
the arbitrator could find just cause requirement based on arbitration agreement, employee 
handbook, practices and statements by management). 
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arbitrator’s implication of just cause as part of an arbitration agreement has 
been upheld even in an “at will” state, because the use of arbitration to settle 
employment-related disputes “necessarily alters the employment 
relationship from at-will to something else — some standard of discernable 
cause is inherently required in this context where an arbitration panel is 
called on to interpret the employment relationship.”69  The Eight Circuit 
explained that if the arbitration procedure did not change the employee’s at-
will status, “the arbitration procedure designed to interpret that employment 
relationship would serve no identifiable purpose.”70 
Even though an employer, a union or an individual employee can seek 
to negate an arbitrator’s award in court, the Federal Arbitration Act limits 
judicial review of arbitration awards to instances “where the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, 
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”71  A 
court will not “reconsider the merits of an award[,] even though the parties 
may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of 
the contract[,]”72 and a court will not overturn an arbitrator’s fact findings.73  
A manifest disregard of the law, not merely an error in determination or 
application of law, is required to vacate the arbitrator’s award.74 
The Supreme Court has supported lower courts’ reluctance to second 
guess arbitrators’ decisions on fact or law.75  As long an arbitrator is acting 
within his or her authority, courts typically refuse to reverse an award even 
if an arbitrator commits “serious error.”76  This deference to an arbitrator’s 
award has included upholding an arbitrator’s opinion that a CBA requires 
just cause for discharges, where the agreement does not explicitly restrict the 
arbitrator’s authority to review discharges to determine whether the 
employer had cause.77 
 
 69.  PaineWebber, 49 F.3d at 352.  But see Raymond James Fin. Servs. v. Bishop, 596 
F.3d 183, 195 n.16 (4th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing role of arbitration under agreements 
providing expressly that employees are at will). 
 70.  PaineWebber, 49 F.3d at 352. 
 71.  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). 
 72.  United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987). 
 73.  Entergy Operations, Inc. v. United Gov’t Sec. Officers, 856 F.3d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 
2017) (citing Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204 of the Int’l Bhd. of Elec. 
Workers, 834 F.2d 1424, 1427 (8th Cir. 1987)). 
 74.  Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs Int’l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 
1967). 
 75.  W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 765 (1983). 
 76.  E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000).   
 77.  See, e.g., Kensington Cmty. Corp. for Individual Dignity v. Nat’l Union of Hosp. & 
Health Care Emps., No. 15-2942, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85058 at *21 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 
2016) (“As nothing in the agreement . . . explicitly restricts the arbitrator’s authority to review 
whether there was cause for discharge . . . the Arbitrator’s reading is logical.”). 
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Following this direction from the Supreme Court, a court will not 
reverse a labor arbitration award so long as “the arbitrator’s award draws its 
essence from the collective bargaining agreement, and is not merely [the 
arbitrator’s] own brand of industrial justice . . . .”78  “An award draws its 
essence from a collective bargaining agreement if its interpretation can in 
any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in light of its 
language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties’ intention.”79  This 
deference allows an arbitrator to base a decision on “the industrial common 
law — the practices of the industry and the shop.”80  For example, an 
arbitrator’s interpretation of a CBA’s just cause provision drew its essence 
from the agreement, even though the award required reinstatement of a 
chronically absent employee, because the award was not “entirely 
unsupported by the record” or in manifest disregard of the CBA.81  This 
decision echoes that court’s earlier determination that because the term 
“cause” in a CBA is ambiguous, “it is within the province of the arbitrator to 
interpret the ambiguous phrase.”82  Even if a CBA allows management to 
adopt policies or rules unilaterally, an arbitrator still retains the authority to 
interpret any applicable just cause protection in the CBA.83 
An award may be challenged if it conflicts with public policy, but only 
based on a “well defined and dominant” public policy arising from “laws and 
legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public 
interests.”84  The Supreme Court rejected public-policy based challenges to 
 
 78.  Id. at *8; see also PPG Indus., Inc. v. Local 45C, Int’l Chem. Workers Union 
Council, 587 F.3d 648, 652 (4th Cir. 2009) (mentioning that an arbitrator cannot “‘ignore the 
plain language of the contract’ to impose his ‘own notions of industrial justice’”); 
Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, 76 F.3d 606, 608 (4th 
Cir. 1996) (holding that the court must overturn an arbitration award which “fails to draw its 
essence from the collective bargaining agreement or reflects the arbitrator’s own notions of 
right and wrong”). 
 79.  Brentwood Med. Assocs. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 396 F.3d 237, 241 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original). 
 80.  United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 
(1960). 
 81.  Dauphin Precision Tool v. United Steelworkers of Am., 338 Fed. App. 219, 223 (3d 
Cir. 2009). 
 82.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seaman’s Union, 73 F.3d 1287, 1295-96 (3d Cir. 
1996); see also Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Sec., Police & Fire Prof’ls, No. 1:15-cv-01327-
JCC-IDD (E.D. Va. May 5, 2016) (finding employer’s policy supporting allegation of just 
cause did not require discharge for grievant’s action, so arbitrator empowered to interpret 
“just cause”); Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Commonwealth Ass’n of Sch. Adm’rs, Teamsters Local 
502, 160 A.3d 928, 931-32 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (holding that the trial court erred to extent 
that it held that arbitrator misinterpreted contract to require “just cause”). 
 83.  Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Food & Commercial Workers, 739 F.3d 
1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 2014); Breckenridge O’Fallon, Inc. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 682, 
664 F.3d 1230, 1234, 1234 n.2 (8th Cir. 2012).  
 84.  W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, 
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arbitral awards reinstating a truck driver who tested positive for drugs,85 and 
an operator of dangerous machinery found sitting alone in a car in the 
company parking lot with a marijuana cigarette burning in the ashtray.86 
The reluctance to reverse arbitration awards on public policy grounds 
is exemplified by the Supreme Court’s decision that even well-founded civil 
rights protections did not warrant the reversal of an arbitral award on public 
policy grounds, even though the award enforced male employees’ 
contractual seniority over the equal-employment rights of female 
employees.87  In making such a determination, a court must not “second-
guess[] the arbitrator’s fact-finding,” especially where a reversal based on 
public policy would require a court to draw factual inferences that were not 
made by the arbitrator.88  Therefore, an award reversing a discharge decision 
will only be overturned if a grievant’s reinstatement would violate a clear 
public policy; conversely, an award in the employer’s favor will stand unless 
the failure to reinstate would violate public policy.89 
This limited judicial review of arbitration awards heightens the 
importance of determining whether arbitrators’ interpretations of just cause 
protections provide adequate protection for the interests of people with 
disabilities.  If the arbitrator addresses the ADA rights of the employee along 
with a just cause determination, the employee may be left without any 
judicial recourse beyond this limited review of the arbitration award, even 
though she might otherwise have a claim under the ADA. 
III.    EFFECTIVENESS OF JUST CAUSE IN RETAINING EMPLOYMENT FOR 
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 
Just cause provisions offer protection for employees with disabilities 
who face discharge for a variety of reasons, including misconduct, 
absenteeism, or an inability to otherwise perform their job duties.  This 
inability to perform, as well as some forms of misconduct or absenteeism, 
often arise when the employer has not provided sufficient accommodation 
for an employee’s disability.  An employee with a disability may incorporate 
a claim for accommodation in a just cause claim to get the issue before an 
arbitrator who is otherwise reluctant to apply the ADA.90  Several aspects of 
 
Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).  See, e.g., Iowa Elec. Light & Power 
Co. v. Local Union 204, 834 F.2d 1424, 1427 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that “there is a well 
defined and dominant national policy requiring strict adherence to nuclear safety rules”). 
 85.  E. Associated Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 62-67. 
 86.  Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 33, 42-45. 
 87.  W.R. Grace and Co., 461 U.S. at 764-70. 
 88.  U.S. Postal Serv. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 839 F.2d 146, 148 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 89.  E. Associated Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 62-63. 
 90.  Daniel B. Moar, Arbitrating Hate: Why Binding Arbitration of Discrimination 
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arbitration are important to understand to determine whether arbitration 
provides a viable forum for people with disabilities to protect themselves 
against unwarranted discharge.  While these aspects do not always benefit 
the employee with a disability, she is often treated more favorably under the 
arbitrator’s analysis than she would be under judicial application of the 
ADA. 
First, placement of the burden of proof on the employer in arbitration 
claims concerning just cause protection will benefit the employee with a 
disability, who would carry the burden of proving discriminatory intent or 
disparate impact in an ADA claim.  Secondly, the application of just cause 
principles can be beneficial for employees with disabilities for several 
reasons, taking advantage of some of the basic principles requiring notice to 
the employee of expected standards as well as consideration of the 
employer’s past practice in enforcing such standards.  In addition, employees 
with disabilities can benefit from an arbitrator’s application of other 
contractual rights as well as mitigating circumstances related to the basis for 
the discharge, although an arbitrator may also consider the employer’s 
interests in discharging the employee.  Lastly, an arbitrator will determine 
whether the employer had just cause to impose discharge, as opposed to 
some lesser punishment, which can benefit an employee who might 
otherwise fail to convince a court that an employer lacked a legitimate reason 
for the discharge in an ADA claim if the employee engaged in some type of 
bad behavior. 
A. Burden of Proof 
The discharge of an employee with a disability raises some interesting 
issues of contract interpretation for an arbitrator. Placement of the burden of 
proof on the employer can be particularly important in determining whether 
the employee cannot perform essential job duties, because that employer 
must then establish this negative fact.  In addition, claims that turn on 
medical evidence may be resolved in favor of the employee if the employer 
cannot carry its burden of proving a critical medical fact regarding the 
employee’s impairment as it relates to essential job duties. 
In contrast to an ADA plaintiff’s burden of proof, the employer 
typically carries the burden of proof in establishing that it had just cause to 
discipline or discharge a grievant.91  At least some arbitrators take the 
 
Claims is Appropriate for Union Members, 10 DUQ. BUS. L. J. 47, 62 (2008). 
 91.  Laura J. Cooper, et al., How and Why Labor Arbitrators Decide Discipline and 
Discharge Cases. An Empirical Examination, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 60TH ANNUAL MEETING 
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 420, 451-52 (2007); Arnold M. Zack, How 
Arbitrators Decide Cases: An Arbitrator’s View, in HOW ADR WORKS 515, 522 (Norman 
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position that the burden of proof remains with the employer even if a grievant 
raises statutory protections which would otherwise place the burden of proof 
on the plaintiff-employee.92  Claims by employees with disabilities often turn 
on what duties are essential and whether the employee can perform those 
duties.93  The resolution of these factual questions often turns on the 
arbitrator’s application of the burden of proof, when presented as a question 
of just cause.  In situations where the grievant also invokes contractual rights, 
such as a right to take leave or transfer to another position as an alternative 
to discharge, the burden would be on the union or the employee to establish 
a violation of that contractual right.94 
If a grievant has invoked just cause protection, the applicable standard 
of proof in discharge cases usually requires that the employer prove both that 
the employee committed the offense for which she was discharged and that 
the offense warranted the degree of discipline imposed.95  Typically the 
employer must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that its 
action was justified.96  Some arbitrators adhere to the proposition that “the 
more serious the charge against an employee the higher the level of proof is 
required to make the case.”97  In one study of 2,055 awards, it was determined 
that over 88% of the arbitrators applied the preponderance standard.98  
Another study of 1,432 awards concerning discharges found that 9.9% 
articulated the burden of proof at preponderance of the evidence and 12.2% 
required proof of just cause by clear and convincing evidence (making proof 
of just cause significantly more difficult), whereas 76% of the awards did not 
identify an applicable quantum standard.99 
Under the burden to produce a preponderance of evidence to support 
 
Brand, ed., BNA: Washington, D.C. 2002); see, e.g., Waste Corp. of Mo., 131 Lab. Arb. Rep. 
(BNA) 1654, 1655 (2013) (Fizsimmons, Arb.) (holding that in discharge cases, the arbitrator 
must determine whether the employer had just cause to terminate the grievant’s employment); 
Atl. Se. Airlines, 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 515, 521 (1993) (Nolan, Arb.) (“By long and 
well-recognized custom in labor arbitration, employers bear the burden of proof in 
disciplinary cases.”). 
 92.  Zack, supra note 92, at 522. 
 93.  See discussion infra at notes 105-120 and accompanying text. 
 94.  Zack, supra note 92, at 519-20. 
 95.  See, e.g., Farmland Foods, Inc., 130 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 745, 748 (2012) (Bonney, 
Arb.) (“In order to shoulder its burden, the employer must prove both that the employee 
committed the offense for which she was discharged and that the offense warranted the degree 
of discipline imposed.”). 
 96.  Cooper, supra note 92, at 452.  See, e.g., Meridian Med. Techs., 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. 
(BNA) 1564, 1567 (2001) (King, Arb.) (“Generally, the employer meets this burden if it 
shows, by a preponderance of evidence, that its action was justified.”). 
 97.  Mercy St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 705, 723 (2015) (Imundo, 
Arb.). 
 98.  Cooper, supra note 92, at 453. 
 99.  Bognanno, supra note 40, at 174-77. 
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the employer’s action, circumstantial evidence can be used to establish the 
elements of a particular action, but the evidence must “do more than give 
rise to mere suspicion,”100 and should be “based on a reasonable probability 
and not on mere speculation.”101  Such words of caution are particularly 
appropriate for decisions involving the discharge of employees with 
disabilities because the employer assumes that they cannot perform the 
duties of the position, pose a direct threat, or will not be available to return 
to work in a reasonable amount of time.  Thus, placing the burden of proof 
on the employer may by itself provide protection for employees with 
disabilities that they would not enjoy under the ADA alone. 
1. Proof of What Duties are Essential 
Arbitration can play several roles with respect to the ability to perform 
the essential duties of the position, including making factual determinations 
regarding the grievant’s abilities or the essential nature of the job duties 
which she cannot perform.  An employee with a disability often faces 
discharge based on an employer’s belief that she can no longer perform the 
job duties.  This employee will benefit from just cause protection if the 
employer cannot establish by a preponderance of the evidence that her 
disability prevents her from performing an essential job duty.102  For 
example, an employer could not establish that the grievant was discharged 
for a “job-related reason” based on his inability to lift over fifty pounds, 
where the employee continued to work successfully for several months under 
these restrictions before his discharge.103 
Arbitrators often give considerable deference to an employer’s 
 
 100.  Mich. Milk Producers Ass’n, 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1024, 1029 (2000) 
(McDonald, Arb.). 
 101.  Dietrich Indus., Inc., 83 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 287, 289 (1984) (Abrams, Arb.). 
 102.  See, e.g., Noranda Aluminum, 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 217, 221 (2003) (Gordon, 
Arb.) (“In sum, Grievant’s discharge lacked just cause because it was based on medical 
evaluation that, under the circumstances, should have been more extensive.”). 
 103.  Coreslab Structures, 129 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 329, 332 (2011) (Pratte, Arb.); see 
also Bowater, 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 129, 137 (2004) (Harris, Arb.) (finding sufficient 
medical evidence to establish grievant’s ability to perform job duties); Super Value, 119 Lab. 
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1377, 1382-83 (2004) (Daly, Arb.) (finding no just cause to discharge a 
maintenance mechanic with glaucoma who could still “drive slow-moving man-lift vehicles 
in the . . . warehouse”); Beef Prods., 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1308, 1311-12 (2002) (Allen, 
Arb.) (ruling that an employer violated CBA by discharging grievant who was not totally 
disabled according to medical evidence); Davis Wire Corp., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1345, 
1350 (2000) (Olson, Arb.) (overturning refusal to return grievant to work based on physician’s 
general recommendation); Eastwood Printing Co., 99 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 957, 963 (1992) 
(Winwood, Arb.) (finding no just cause because employer failed to investigate employee’s 
ability to use arm to perform duties). 
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definition of which duties are essential, as they do in ADA decisions.104  
Despite this deference, placement of the burden of proof on the employer 
may make such deference less automatic.  One arbitrator explained that an 
employer can establish just cause related to an inability to perform one’s job 
duties based on its “objective evaluation of medical evidence, a fair 
evaluation of the physical requirements of the essential functions to be 
performed and the ability to provide work within the employee’s 
restrictions.”105  In contrast to arbitrators’ typical deference to past practice 
to interpret ambiguous contractual obligations, duties may still be deemed 
essential even if the employer’s past practice has not included assignment of 
the duties in question over a long period of time.106 
Under the ADA, the duty to accommodate turns on whether the 
proposed accommodation would enable the employee with a disability to 
perform the duties of the position.107  Arbitrators follow this same line of 
logic.  If an employee cannot perform any work available with the employer, 
then the employer has just cause to discharge her.108  For example, an 
employer had just cause to discharge a material handler who could not stand, 
kneel and climb as required of his position.109  The duties could not be 
performed even if he was allowed to take the number of breaks 
recommended by his doctor, notably more than allowed for other 
employees.110 
In contrast, an employer may lack just cause despite an employee’s 
inability to perform the duties of a position, if accommodation would have 
enabled her to do so.  For example, GTE lacked just cause to discharge a 
technician who could perform his work even though he could not climb 
ladders, where technicians typically chose their specific jobs and he could 
choose jobs which did not require ladder work.111  Thus, without specifically 
invoking the ADA’s protections, this grievant was reinstated because the 
employer failed to prove that the duties he could not perform were not 
essential to his position. 
 
 104.  42 U.S.C. §12111(8); see, e.g., Gardenhire v. Manville, No. 15-cv-4914-DDC-KGS, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15348 at *15-16 (Feb. 2, 2017) (referring to job description as 
evidence of essential functions). 
 105.  Premier Mfg. Support Svcs., 2005 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp. 111197 (2005) 
(Hetrick, Arb.). 
 106.  148147-AAA, 2013 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp. 148147 (2013) (Daly, Arb.) 
(noting that fire suppression duties were essential for the firefighter dispatch job, even though 
the duty was not assigned to dispatchers over 36 years). 
 107.  Lucas v. W. W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001); LaChance v. 
Duffer’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 108.  CH2M-WG Idaho, 134 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 876, 885-86 (2014) (DiFalco, Arb.). 
 109.  Case Corp., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1, 3-4 (1999) (Thornell, Arb.). 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  GTE North, 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1047, 1049-50, 1052 (1999) (Daniel, Arb.). 
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In a more complex example, an employer demonstrated just cause to 
discharge a driver with a mental illness, without accommodating him, where 
the arbitrator concluded that the chances for rehabilitation were “remote” so 
as to enable the employee to perform the job duties.112  Under a clear and 
convincing evidence standard, this arbitrator concluded that the employer 
established just cause to discharge an employee with “psychiatric problems” 
based on “poor job performance and extraordinary actions” which included 
wearing a Halloween costume to work.113  Even though the CBA 
incorporated the duty to accommodate under the ADA, the arbitrator 
emphasized that the “primary controlling factor in this arbitration case is the 
[a]greement between the parties, specifically the just cause requirement for 
discharge.”114  The arbitrator concluded that the employer had just cause to 
discharge the driver based in large part on his doctor’s statement that he 
lacked control over his aggression and hostility and the driver’s failure to 
take his prescribed medication.115 
These arbitration awards illustrate how an employee with a disability 
can benefit from the placement of the burden of proof on the employer to 
establish her inability to perform the essential duties of the position.  In 
contrast, under the ADA, the employee carries the burden of proof to 
establish discrimination, which includes not only the existence of their 
disability, but also the fact that she is otherwise qualified to perform the 
duties of the position.116  In situations where the employer controls the 
information regarding the nature of the plaintiff’s work as well as the duties 
of other employees, this burden can be a difficult one to meet.117 
2. Medical Evidence 
Like their judicial counterparts, arbitrators will consistently find just 
cause for the discharge of an employee based on factual determinations that 
the grievant’s impairment prevents their performance of the duties or 
required work hours of the position.118  Generally, employers are entitled to 
 
 112.  Interstate Brands Corp., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 161, 168-69 (1999) (Howell, 
Arb.). 
 113.  Id. at 166, 168-69. 
 114.  Id. at 168. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 
(1999). 
 117.  See, e.g., Hawkins v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 778 F.3d 877, 890-91 (10th Cir. 
2015) (requiring the plaintiff to prove ability to perform essential duties of the position). 
 118.  Dairy Fresh of Ala., 130 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 137 (2011) (Moreland, Arb.) 
(holding that the employer had just cause to discharge employee with manic depression unable 
to perform duties per independent medical examiner); Union Tank Car Co., 130 Lab. Arb. 
Rep. (BNA) 62, 66-67 (2011) (Fullmer, Arb.) (finding that one of four doctor’s reports 
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rely on their medical advisors “where there is no reason to doubt their 
accuracy or good faith . . . .”119  However, that evidence must be reliable 
enough to support a finding of just cause.120  For example, after finding that 
the grievant was not a person with a disability under the ADA, one award 
held that the employer had just cause to discharge an employee with a lifting 
restriction which prevented him from performing common duties of his 
position without any accommodation.121 
The just cause standard has been relied upon to deny grievances of 
employees with disabilities based on medical evidence related to the 
grievants’ ability to perform the duties of their positions.122  For example, an 
employer showed just cause to discharge a janitor based on the employer’s 
conclusion that the grievant’s medical restrictions did not justify his refusal 
to perform his job duties.123  At the same time, an arbitrator may require that 
an employer engage in the interactive process, as contemplated by the 
ADA,124 to determine whether the grievant is able to perform the duties of 
her position.125 
As with the question of which duties are essential, placement of the 
burden of proof on the employer requires the production of reliable medical 
 
justified employer’s refusal to allow grievant to return to work under burden on grievant to 
show lack of just cause); Techneglass Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 722, 726-27 (2004) 
(Dean, Arb.) (ruling that just cause was shown by grievant’s inability to perform duties); 
United Refining Co., 2003 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp. 110488 (2003) (Miller, Arb.) (ruling 
that just cause was shown where grievant was unable to work eight hour day indefinitely and 
no part-time jobs were available); Empire Coke Co., 2001 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp. 
109273 (2001) (Giblin, Arb.) (finding proper cause for discharge where impairment from on 
the job injury prevented performance of duties); City of St. Paul, 1996 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 
Supp. 117294 (1996) (Berquist, Arb.) (finding just cause to discharge employee who could 
not perform duties in timely manner); Meier Metal Servicenters, 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 
816, 819 (1993) (Morgan, Arb.). 
 119.  DENNIS R. NOLAN & RICHARD A. BALES, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN 
A NUTSHELL 259 (3d ed. 2017). 
 120.  KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 425. 
 121.  City of Minneapolis, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 558, 562 (2008) (Chernos, Arb.). 
 122.  See, e.g., Rock-Tenn Servs., 131 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1468, 1487-88 (2013) 
(Kossoff, Arb.); Rochdale Vill., 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 196, 198-99 (2008) (Gregory, 
Arb.); Bradford White Corp., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 114, 117-18 (1999) (Allen, Arb.) 
(ruling that employer could rely on doctor’s statement that grievant could return to work); see 
also Westinghouse Hanford Co., 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 46, 51-52 (1993) (Nelson, Arb.) 
(ruling that employer could rely on medical evaluation showing inability to work). 
 123.  U.S. Steel Corp., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1801, 1805 (2005) (Peterson, Arb.). 
 124.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2017); Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 929 (7th Cir. 
2001); see also Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1284-86 (7th Cir. 
1996) (noting that an employer cannot assume inability to perform without engaging in the 
interactive process). 
 125.  Milwaukee Transp. Servs., 2009 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp. 119548 (2009) 
(Vernon, Arb.); Minn. Mining & Mfg., 112 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1055, 1059-60 (1999) 
(Bankston, Arb.). 
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evidence that the employee cannot perform the essential job duties of the 
position, or that the employee poses a direct threat even with 
accommodation.126  For example, an arbitrator reinstated an employee whose 
doctors stated that he could safely return to work because his manic 
depression was in remission, despite his employer’s desire for a guarantee 
that the employee would not suffer another attack.127  In contrast, under the 
ADA the employee would carry the burden of producing medical evidence 
establishing her ability to perform the duties of the position, either with or 
without reasonable accommodation.128  Given the potential uncertainty 
surrounding medical diagnoses as well as ambiguity regarding job duties, 
this burden often proves to be too difficult for an ADA plaintiff to meet.129  
Thus, any ambiguity works in favor of a grievant with a disability where the 
employer carries the burden of establishing just cause. 
B. Application of Just Cause Principles in Arbitration 
Employees with disabilities may benefit from an arbitrator’s 
incorporation of a duty to accommodate into interpretations of just cause 
protection in CBA’s.  One arbitrator explained that reasonable 
accommodation “has long been recognized as an element of just cause by 
arbitrators[,]” in part based on the broader societal value of the right of 
persons with disabilities to “hold jobs they can perform . . . .”130  To fulfill 
that value, the arbitrator stated that while he could not determine whether the 
employer violated the ADA, he could look to the ADA for guidance as to 
whether the employer’s decision to discharge the grievant based on absences 
 
 126.  Hatter v. WMATA, 244 F. Supp. 3d 132, 136-37 (D.D.C. 2017) (employer failed to 
present evidence of inability to perform essential functions of job); Osborne v. Baxter 
Haealthcare Corp., 798 F.3d 1260, 1268-69 (10th Cir. 2015) (burden on employer to establish 
direct threat with reasonable accommodation). 
 127.  Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 98 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1199, 1202 (1992) (Nolan, Arb.). 
 128.  See, e.g., Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Prods., Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1217 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(finding that employee with multiple sclerosis and depression failed to prove ability to 
perform duties). 
 129.  See, e.g., Bratten v. SSI Servs., 185 F.3d 625, 635 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding 
physician’s testimony insufficient to establish that employee was otherwise qualified). 
 130.  Thermo King, 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 612, 615 (1993) (Dworkin, Arb.); see also 
GTE N. Inc., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 665, 672 (1999) (Brodsky, Arb.) (concluding that 
incorporation of reasonable accommodation into just cause determination was appropriate 
based on CBA’s inclusion of both general nondiscrimination clause and conflict with law 
provision); Nat’l Linen Supply, 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 4, 8 (1996) (Ross, Arb.); Beckett 
Paper Co., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1135, 1139 (1996) (Goggin, Arb.) (holding that just 
cause requirement requires reasonable accommodation as alternative to discharge from 
position that employee cannot otherwise perform); Meijer Inc., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 
834, 840 (1994) (Daniel, Arb.) (noting that rights established by law must be taken into 
consideration in determining whether just cause exists). 
HICKOX_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  3:15 PM 
364 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20.2 
 
and tardiness related to his disability and “beyond his control” was “just and 
fair.”131 
Under this approach, an arbitrator should consider an employer’s duty 
to accommodate when determining whether the employer had just cause to 
discharge an employee who was not accommodated.132  Incorporation of 
reasonable accommodation into a just cause determination can be 
appropriate based on the CBA’s inclusion of both a general 
nondiscrimination clause and a conflict with law provision.133  Even a non-
discrimination provision alone has been interpreted as sufficient to consider 
the ADA’s requirements.134 
In 1966, Arbitrator Carroll R. Daugherty set forth seven tests for 
determining just cause; a “no” response to any of these questions would 
result in a finding of a lack of just cause:135 
1. Did the company give to the employee forewarning or 
foreknowledge of the possible or probably [sic] disciplinary 
consequences of the employee’s conduct? 
2. Was the company’s rule or managerial order reasonably 
related to (a) the orderly, efficient, and safe operation of the 
company’s business and (b) the performance that the company 
might properly expect of the employee? 
3. Did the company, before administering discipline to an 
employee, make an effort to discover whether the employee 
did in fact violate or disobey a rule or order of management? 
4. Was the company’s investigation conducted fairly and 
objectively? 
5. At the investigation, did the “judge” obtain substantial 
evidence or proof that the employee was guilty as charged? 
6. Has the company applied its rules, orders, and penalties 
evenhandedly and without discrimination to all employees? 
7. Was the degree of discipline administered by the company in 
a particular case reasonably related to (a) the seriousness of 
the employee’s proven offense and (b) the record of the 
employee in his service with the company? 
These seven tests have been characterized as “the most specifically 
articulated analysis of the just cause standard as well as an extremely 
 
 131.  102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 615. 
 132.  Ariana R. Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us About Labor Arbitration of 
Employment-Discrimination Claims, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 789 (2013). 
 133.  GTE N. Inc., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 665. 
 134.  Perfection Bakeries, Inc., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1043 (1997) (Stallworth, Arb.); 
Champion Int’l Corp., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1024 (1996) (Howell, Arb.); see also 
Fairweather’s PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 578 (Ray J. Schoonhoven 
ed., 4th ed. 1999). 
 135.  Enter. Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 359, 363-64 (1966) (Daugherty, Arb.) 
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practical approach”136 and, perhaps for this reason, have been used routinely 
for over fifty years.137  This test has been described as “the single most 
definitive statement of just cause”138 and “undeniably influential.”139  Others 
have described this test as enjoying “‘widespread acceptance.’”140  Some 
have said that these tests have “helped to improve the fairness of disciplinary 
processes . . . .”141  One court characterized the test as providing a “helpful 
and familiar rubric by which an arbitrator can assess whether good cause for 
discipline exists in a particular circumstance.”142  Despite its apparent 
widespread acceptance, one study found that only 9.4% of 1,432 arbitration 
awards concerning employee discharges explicitly utilized the just cause 
rubric,143 but this study may not have captured the unstated influence of the 
rule. 
These principles for applying a just cause clause to a particular 
employee’s discharge benefit employees with disabilities for several reasons, 
including the employer’s general obligation to provide notice of any policies 
for which the employee might be disciplined and to treat similarly situated 
employees comparably.  In addition, an employee with a disability will at 
least sometimes benefit from other contractual protections that may be 
interpreted jointly with a just cause provision or separately to the employee’s 
benefit.  Employees with disabilities will also often benefit from an 
arbitrator’s consideration of mitigating circumstances in determining 
whether the employer had just cause to discharge them, including the role of 
the person’s impairment in the discharge decision as well as the 
appropriateness of discharge as the level of discipline. 
1. Notice & Past Practice 
The principles of just cause suggest that an employee must be aware of 
the rule or other criteria relied upon by the employer in making the decision 
 
 136.  KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 27. 
 137.  See Summit Cty. Children Servs. Bd. v. Commc’n Workers of Am., Local 4546, 865 
N.E.2d 31, 31-36 (Ohio 2007); see e.g., KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 2 and n.1, 24-25, 
and n.59 and 60. 
 138.  CHRISTINE D. VER PLOEG, Investigatory Due Process and Arbitration, in 
ARBITRATION 1992: IMPROVING ARBITRAL AND ADVOCACY SKILLS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 45TH 
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 220, 223–24 (Gruenberg ed., 
1993). 
 139.  JAMES OLDHAM, Due Process in Discipline and Discharge: §6.12 Due Process in 
General, THE COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE: THE VIEWS OF ARBITRATORS 201, 202 
cmt.(a)(3) (Theodore J. St. Antoine ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
 140.  Bognanno, supra note 40, at 158. 
 141.  KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 32, at 29. 
 142.  Summit Cty., 865 N.E.2d at 36. 
 143.  Bognanno, supra note 40, at 174. 
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to discharge her.144  Progressive discipline, at least for certain offenses, may 
also be implied as part of just cause.145  Despite this notice requirement, some 
actions may be so commonly acknowledged as wrong by society, such as 
theft, or in the workplace, such as falling asleep on the job, as to obviate the 
need for prior notice.146 
Notice to employees that discharge can result as a penalty for certain 
behavior may also be required.147  The just cause principle of providing a 
warning may benefit a grievant who allegedly has engaged in misconduct, 
as in the employee who was not warned that he could be discharged if he did 
not take his medication for depression and the employee who was not warned 
against sleeping during a break.148 
Arbitration decisions have long recognized the right of a company to 
impose a non-disciplinary discharge, including discharge based on the 
employee’s inability to perform the work.149  This right is not absolute, 
however, as the employer may have an obligation to warn and work with the 
employee150 and provide adequate training,151 in a way that is “calculated to 
address the particular employee . . . .”152  For example, a power company 
lacked just cause to discharge an employee with a learning disability, despite 
his failing a mandatory hazardous materials handling course, based on its 
failure to tailor its instruction to his disability.153 
Like the notice requirement, consideration of an employer’s past 
practice can be beneficial for an employee asserting a lack of just cause.  If 
a contract term is vague or ambiguous, the arbitrator will turn to past practice 
to help interpret that right.154  Past practice can be used to supplement the 
actual contractual language that applies, but only if such a practice is 
established by mutual acceptance by the parties of a clear and consistent 
practice over a significant period of time.155  Past practice can be particularly 
 
 144.  KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 35-39. 
 145.  Id. at 70-75. 
 146.  Id. at 39-46. 
 147.  Id. at 47-50. 
 148.  Laidlaw Transit Inc., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 302, 306 (1995) (Concepcion, 
Arb.); EG & G Mound Applied Techs., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 60, 63-64 (1993) (Heekin, 
Arb.) (“[B]efore disciplinary action can be taken, the subject employee must previously have 
been aware, or should have been aware, of the conduct expected.”). 
 149.  Florsheim Shoe Co., 74 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 705, 708-09 (1980) (Roberts, Arb.). 
 150.  Id. at 709. 
 151.  Bell Helicopter Textron, 74 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1139, 1141 (1980) (Shearer, 
Arb.). 
 152.   Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 393, 399 (1993) 
(Pelofsky, Arb.). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Zack, supra note 93, at 520. 
 155.  NOLAN & BALES, supra note 120, at 248-49. 
HICKOX_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  3:15 PM 
2017] ARBITRATION OF JUST CAUSE CLAIMS 367 
 
helpful to guard against the influence of implicit biases against employees 
with disabilities, since an employer is expected to apply standards 
consistently across all similarly situated employees. 
Past practice involves the comparison of the treatment of the grievant 
to how the employer has dealt with other employees in the past.156  Of course 
the grievant must establish that her conduct is similar enough to the conduct 
of another employee to benefit from the employer’s past practice of excusing 
that behavior.157 
If a grievant with a disability has been treated more harshly than other 
employees, consideration of past practice can support an arbitrator’s finding 
of a lack of just cause in favor of an employee with a disability.  For example, 
an arbitrator relied on the just cause provision of a CBA to sustain the 
grievance of an employee with a disability who was discharged after being 
absent for more than six months after being injured on job.158  The arbitrator 
engaged in typical just cause analysis, finding that the employer’s policy of 
discharging all employees who are absent for over six months had not been 
applied consistently, and that the CBA allowed for a leave of absence “for 
good cause,” defined to include accidental injury.159 
Similarly, a driver’s grievance was sustained under the CBA’s just 
cause standard where the employer failed to warn him that he would be 
discharged if he did not take his medication, and the employer had tolerated 
his condition for a long time.160  This award relied on basic principles of just 
cause – the failure to warn employees and employer’s past acceptance of 
behavior as minimizing factors.161  Neither of these employees would have 
been guaranteed success in an ADA claim, because both absenteeism and 
insubordination can constitute legitimate business reasons for discharge.  
These awards illustrate the benefit of a CBA’s just cause provision to push 
an employer to provide accommodations, regardless of whether the employer 
had a duty to accommodate under the ADA. 
Grievants with disabilities may fail in challenging a discharge where 
other employees with similar characteristics have been treated similarly.162  
Under just cause analysis, arbitrators similarly consider the nature of the 
 
 156.  KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 20. 
 157.  Id. at 375. 
 158.  Magnolia Mktg. Co., 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 102, 109 (1996) (Chumley, Arb.). 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 305-06. 
 161.  Id. at 306. 
 162.  See, e.g., Safeway Corp., 2008 Lab. Arb. Supp. 119039 (Wages, Arb. 2008) (holding 
that the grievant was treated consistently with past practice of assigning injured employees to 
different work). But see Dept. of Commerce, 1999 Lab. Arb. Supp. (BNA) 107763 (finding 
that an employer is obligated to accommodate employee where similar employees had been 
accommodated in the past). 
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threat posed by the employee who has been discharged.163  An employer had 
just cause to discharge an employee with schizophrenia, for example, where 
coworkers felt threatened by the employee’s comment, “‘[n]o wonder people 
bring guns to work[,]’” made in response to harassment by coworkers.164  
Analogizing to the dismissal of an ADA claim by an employee who 
threatened to kill a coworker,165 the arbitrator found that the employer had 
discharged other employees whose actions were “provocative, hostile, 
threatening and could easily rise to a level of violence.”166 
Under just cause analysis, employees who allegedly pose a direct threat 
may benefit from the principle of considering how other similarly situated 
employees have been treated.  In upholding the grievance against Walt 
Disney, for example, the arbitrator noted that just cause protection applies 
regardless of the employee’s seniority, where an employee with more 
seniority had not been discharged for engaging in assaultive behavior.167 
Past practice analysis can also benefit a grievant who has been 
discharged for his absenteeism if the employer has not discharged similarly 
situated employees in the past, so as to put him on notice that he could be 
discharged based on his absenteeism.168  Conversely, an employer’s 
consistent enforcement of an absenteeism policy will help establish just 
cause to discharge a grievant with a similar record.169 
Following this line of logic, an employer’s past practice of providing a 
transfer to another position, including light duty, can help sustain the 
grievance of a similarly situated employee with a disability who seeks a 
similar transfer.170  In contrast, other arbitrators have found that an employer 
need not create a light duty position for a grievant.171  These seemingly 
inconsistent awards are consistent with court analysis under the ADA, which 
 
 163.  See, e.g., CH2M-WG Idaho, 134 LAB. ARB. REP. (BNA) 876, 883-84 (Difalco, Arb. 
2014) (finding plaintiff’s exposure at work posed a direct threat to her health). 
 164.  Anchor Hocking, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 312, 318-20 (2008) (Cohen, Arb.). 
 165.  Palmer v. Cir. Ct. of Cook Cty., 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 166.  Anchor Hocking, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 319. 
 167.  Walt Disney World, 127 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 353, 356-57 (2010) (Abrams, Arb.). 
 168.  Phx. Newspapers Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 771, 774-75 (2004) (Rothstein, 
Arb.). 
 169.  Allied Healthcare Prods., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 890, 894 (2004) (Fitzsimmons, 
Arb.). 
 170.  Sherwin-Williams Co., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1184, 1191 (2000) (Statham, 
Arb.); see also Exxon Co., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 534, 539-40 (1998) (Allen, Arb.) 
(explaining how transferring away stress-causing coworkers is warranted where similarly-
situated others had been transferred). 
 171.  Ga. Pac., Lab. Arb. Rep. Supp. (BNA) 104307, at 13 (1999) (Duda, Arb.); see also 
Altoona Hosp., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 650, 652 (1993) (Jones, Arb.) (finding no 
requirement in CBA to create light duty position, without mention of ADA); Ogden Maint. 
Co., 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 467, 470 (1993) (Harr, Arb.) (noting the lack of contractual 
obligation to create light duty job). 
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typically does not require the creation of a position, but may require 
placement of an employee with a disability in an available light duty 
position.172 
These arbitration awards demonstrate that an employee with a disability 
may benefit from an employer’s more lenient or favorable treatment of other 
employees who are not disabled, engaged in similar conduct, but did not 
suffer the same consequences.  In contrast, under the ADA, an employer’s 
past provision of an accommodation does not necessarily establish that the 
accommodation requested by an employee with a disability is reasonable or 
does not impose an undue hardship.173 
2. Supplemental Contractual Rights 
Employees’ just cause protections may be supplemented or supplanted 
by other contractual rights.  Contractual provisions, or the lack thereof, can 
be significant in determining whether the employer had just cause to 
discharge an employee with a disability based on their inability to perform 
the job duties, their unavailability for work, or misconduct.  In addition, just 
cause analysis can be affected significantly by the omission of an obligation 
to follow the ADA in a CBA.  One award, for example, held that the 
employer had just cause to discharge an employee whose impairment 
prevented performance of his job duties, without offering any 
accommodation, because the CBA did not specifically incorporate the 
ADA.174 
In line with this reasoning, some arbitrators have refused to look beyond 
the language of the applicable CBA in resolving grievances, even if filed by 
a person with a disability as defined by the ADA, who might benefit from 
the application of the ADA.175  This can result in a finding of  just cause to 
discharge an employee with a disability without reaching the question of 
reasonable accommodation.  For example, one arbitrator found just cause to 
discharge an employee who became involved in altercations with co-workers 
without considering the possible need for accommodations which would 
 
 172.  Stacy A. Hickox, Transfer as an Accommodation: Standards from Discrimination 
Cases and Theory, 62 ARK. L. REV. 195, 206-14 (2009). 
 173.  See, e.g., Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n, 168 F.3d 661, 671 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding 
that plaintiff’s employer was not required to allow continued leave to plaintiff even though 
the employer had granted it before because continued leave would have created an undue 
burden on the employer).  
 174.  Jefferson-Smurfit Corp., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1041, 1048 (1994) 
(Canestraight, Arb). 
 175.  See id. (finding no contractual duty to transfer employee with disability); see also 
Altoona Hosp., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 652 (explaining that an arbitrator was not 
empowered to interpret the ADA).  
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have addressed the perceived harassment the grievant experienced which led 
to the altercations.176  In contrast, some arbitrators look to the ADA to help 
define a contractual obligation to provide accommodations to employees 
with disabilities.177 
Some arbitrators may not apply a just cause analysis, but still 
consistently find that the employer was empowered to discharge an 
employee who could no longer perform her job duties.178  In contrast to CBAs 
which are silent on an employer’s obligations to reassign duties or the 
employee who cannot perform, contractual requirements may create such an 
obligation. Under a just cause provision, for example, an employer lacked 
just cause to discharge a grievant who could not perform all of the expected 
duties of her chicken processing plant position because of her work-related 
impairment which was known to the employer.179 
Despite its benefits, just cause may not provide protection for an 
employee who engages in clear misconduct, particularly when prohibited by 
specific language in a CBA or employer policy.  For example, two different 
employers had just cause to discharge employees who left their workplaces 
without permission, despite claims that the grievants needed to leave to seek 
medical treatment and could not perform the assigned duties, respectively.180  
One of these awards was based on clear language in the CBA that leaving 
 
 176.  Beckett Paper Co., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1138-39. 
 177.  See, e.g., Multi-Clean, Inc., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 463, 467 (1993) (Miller, 
Arb.). 
 178.  Rock Tenn Co., 133 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1182, 1191-92 (2014) (Miles, Arb.) 
(denying grievance because no job was available consistent with restrictions); Nashville 
Symphony Ass’n, 132 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 174, 189-90 (2013) (Ruben, Arb.) (relying on 
employer’s opinion that employee with disability had not recovered musical skills, 
distinguished from artistic incompetence or misbehavior); Anchor Hocking, 129 Lab. Arb. 
Rep. (BNA) 1619, 1623 (2011) (Murphy, Arb.) (accepting employer’s argument that 
legitimate business interests prevented allowing grievant to work four-hour day); Bobcat Co., 
121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 535, 538 (2005) (Jacobowski, Arb.) (finding no contractual right 
to return to work when no part time positions available) City of Roswell, 109 Lab. Arb. Rep. 
(BNA) 1153, 1159 (1998) (Wyman, Arb.) (denying grievance as grievant continued to be 
medically incapable of performing driver duties); City of Tampa, 111 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 
65, 72-76 (1998) (Hoffman, Arb.) (examining lifting and movement restrictions that 
prevented performance of job duties); Perfection Bakeries, 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1043, 
1159 (1997) (Stallworth, Arb.) (allowing non-disciplinary discharge based on grievant’s 
inability to perform job due to injury); Frito-Lay, 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 993, 995 (1994) 
(Bittel, Arb.) (agreeing that progressive discipline followed in addressing sales deficiencies 
fulfilled obligation to reasonably accommodate grievant); Ogden Maint. Co., 101 Lab. Arb. 
Rep. (BNA) at 470 (finding that employer had implied authority to discharge employee who 
cannot perform duties).  
 179.  ConAgra Poultry Co., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1029, 1034 (2001) (Eisenmenger, 
Arb.). 
 180.  Monongalia Cty. Coal Co., 136 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 131, 134-35 (2015) (Nicholas, 
Arb.); NAES Corp., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1702, 1707-09 (2015) (Riker, Arb.). 
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work without permission warranted discharge, and the potential harm his 
actions could have caused the employer and its customers.181  Similarly, two 
different employers had just cause to discharge grievants who refused to 
abide by mandatory referrals to employee assistance programs.182 
Arbitrators’ review of claims by employees in need of leave can 
produce very different results than would occur under the ADA, depending 
on which contractual provisions apply.  Under the ADA, leave can be 
considered a reasonable accommodation, but at the same time, courts have 
consistently held that an employee who engages in erratic attendance or does 
not properly inform her employer about impending absences is not otherwise 
qualified for employment.183  Likewise, under the ADA, employers typically 
need not accommodate employees who cannot predict when they will be able 
to return to work or whose leave has exceeded the amount of leave provided 
by a CBA or an employer’s policy, without considering whether than policy 
provides adequate accommodation.184 
Like these courts, arbitrators considering questions of leave usage and 
absenteeism look to contractual provisions as well as sometimes considering 
the duty to accommodate under the ADA.  Generally, “[t]he right to 
terminate employees for excessive absences, even where they are caused by 
illness, is generally recognized by arbitrators.”185  Questions of attendance 
may or may not be addressed by a just cause provision of a CBA or an 
employee handbook.  If the just cause provision applies to any discharge, or 
at least discharges which are not voluntary or layoffs, then the employee will 
be protected by that provision.186  For example, two different employers 
lacked just cause to discipline grievants whose absences were allegedly 
unsupported by medical documentation, where the grievants followed the 
procedures required by the parties’ CBA and the employer’s absenteeism 
policy.187 
Even with just cause protection, however, excessive absences188 or the 
 
 181.  NAES Corp., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1707-08. 
 182.  Raytheon Aircraft Co., 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1081, 1083 (1996) (Thornell, 
Arb.); Boise Cascade Corp., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 289, 293-94 (1994) (Lundberg, Arb.). 
 183.  See, e.g., Greer v. Emerson Elec. Co., 185 F.3d 917, 921-22 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 184.  Stacy Hickox & Joseph Guzman, Leave as an Accommodation: When is Enough, 
Enough?, 62 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 437, 457-71 (2014). 
 185.  Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 42, at 796. 
 186.  S. Peninsula Hosp., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 673, 676, 678 (2004) (Landau, Arb.). 
 187.  Tecumseh Prods. Co., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 369, 371 (1996) (Flaten, Arb.); 
Rollyson Aluminum Prods. Inc., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 588, 590-91 (1994) (Heekin, 
Arb.) (finding that the employer failed to establish that grievant’s absences were not medically 
excused, but denying back pay based on grievant’s attitude). 
 188.  Medco Health Sols., 128 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1739-40 (finding just cause where 
grievant was so unreliable as to be of “no value”); Armstrong World Indus., 114 Lab. Arb. 
Rep. (BNA) 540, 547 (2000) (Chumley, Arb.) (finding just cause based on 57% attendance 
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length of the leave alone189 have been sufficient to provide employers with 
justification for discharge, often without any consideration of the ADA’s 
specific parameters for an alternative schedule or leave as an 
accommodation.  Even if the absenteeism is related to an impairment, where 
the threshold of “excessive” is reached, non-disciplinary termination is 
proper.190  When employees on leave are unlikely to ever be able to return to 
work191 or show an improvement in attendance,192 arbitrators have found that 
the employers had just cause to discharge them.  Just cause may also be based 
on the grievant’s failure to follow the employer’s procedures associated with 
taking time off.193  Regardless of just cause protection, a grievant may fail to 
successfully challenge his discharge if his leave exceeded the amount 
provided by the CBA.194 
In contrast to these awards, an employee may benefit from specific 
 
violations, previous issues, presumed failure to take medication, attitude, and problems for 
co-workers); Cont’l Cement Co., 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 829, 836 (1996) (Hilgert, Arb.) 
(explaining just cause under absenteeism policy). 
 189.  148147-AAA, 2013 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp. 148147 (2013) (Daly, Arb.); see 
also Titan Tire Corp., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 235, 237, 254-55 (2015) (Szuter, Arb.) 
(finding that the CBA stated that employee loses rights after 24 months of leave); Cooper-
Standard Auto. Grp., 129 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1700, 1704 (2011) (Dilts, Arb.) (noting that 
the CBA provides for loss of seniority after two years on leave); Delta Nat’l Kraft, 123 Lab. 
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 858, 861 (2007) (Finston, Arb.) (finding just cause to discharge an employee 
whose leave exceeded the one year provided under CBA); AT&T Corp., 2005 Lab. Arb. Rep. 
(BNA) Supp. 115056 (2005) (Goldstein, Arb.) (finding just cause to discharge employee who 
had been accommodated but still with significant absences over a two year period); Case 
Corp., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 449, 451 (2004) (Neigh, Arb.) (finding no violation based 
on discharge after thirty months of leave provided in CBA); CenterPoint Energy, 119 Lab. 
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 102 (2003) (Bognanno, Arb.) (holding employer did not violate CBA by 
discharging grievant after two years of long term disability); Sys. Sensor, 111 Lab. Arb. Rep. 
(BNA) 1186, 1191 (1999) (Cohen, Arb.) (finding that a 50% absence rate justified discharge); 
Hous. Auth. of Louisville, 111 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 121 (1998) (Heekin, Arb.) (enforcing 
one year leave provision in CBA based on consistent past enforcement); Cty. of Sacramento, 
109 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 440, 445 (1997) (Gentile, Arb.) (finding that absences totaling 
60% of work time over past year justified discharge); Altoona Hosp., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. 
(BNA) at 652 (finding that CBA required return to work after 12 months of leave). 
 190.  Medco Health Sols., 128 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1734, 1739 (2010) (Watkins, Arb.); 
Husky Oil Co., 65 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 47, 50 (1975) (Richardson, Arb.) (basing conclusion 
on review of 50 awards). 
 191.  See, e.g., Meier Metal Servicenters, Inc., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 819 
(explaining physical condition making employee unable to work can constitute just cause); 
Papercraft Corp., 85 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 962 (1985) (Hales, Arb.) (holding that employer 
was allowed to discharge where nature of employee’s illness rendered him, perhaps forever, 
unable to perform work duties for which he was hired). 
 192.  Thermo King, 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 616-17 (explaining that the ADA does 
not require allowing an employee to be late or miss work whenever impairment “makes it 
uncomfortable for him to meet his schedule”). 
 193.  H. S. Auto., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 172, 174-75 (1993) (Heekin, Arb.). 
 194.  ATC/Vancom of Cal., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 615, 618 (2004) (McKay, Arb.). 
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contractual provisions providing for some period of leave or a specific 
absenteeism policy.  A discharge violated a CBA, for example, where an 
employee on long-term disability was discharged under a CBA that failed to 
provide that seniority is lost to employees on long-term disability, and no 
employees on long-term disability had been discharged in the past.195  
Similarly, reinstatement was required by a CBA which provided for personal 
leave of absence of an unlimited duration for “good and sufficient cause.”196  
This arbitrator explained that “good and sufficient cause” should be based 
on “any absence that precedes the request, the duration of the employee’s 
expected absence, the likelihood that he will be able to resume his duties on 
his return, and the business needs of the Employer.”197  Without any mention 
of the ADA, this analysis parallels an undue hardship analysis under that 
statute.198 
Like claims involving a leave of absence, a grievant may benefit from 
a specific contractual provision regarding absenteeism.  For example, an 
employer violated a CBA with a specific absenteeism policy when it 
attempted to unilaterally change how that policy was applied.199  Similarly, 
a CBA which includes a specific absenteeism policy could not be unilaterally 
changed by an employer to the detriment of an employee who failed to follow 
the revised policy.200 
Likewise, just cause analysis has benefitted grievants who failed to 
follow required processes connected with their use of leave.  For example, 
an arbitrator relied on just cause analysis to reinstate an employee who 
notified human resources but not the employer’s FMLA administrator that 
he needed to miss work due to his disability.201  The arbitrator considered the 
grievant’s years of service and the symptoms of his disability that interfered 
with his ability to report his need for time off.  It should be noted, however, 
that the arbitrator did impose a ninety-day suspension for which the grievant 
would not receive back pay.202 
Similarly, other grievants have benefitted from just cause analysis 
applied to their alleged failure to provide their employers with sufficient 
 
 195.  Dynergy Midwest Generation, 131 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1529, 1534-35 (2013) 
(Dichter, Arb.). 
 196.  Mills Co., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1723, 1726-28 (2005) (Franckiewicz, Arb.). 
 197.  Id. at 1728. 
 198.  42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2017).  See, e.g., Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s 
Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 782 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the burden is on the employer 
to show undue hardship). 
 199.  Avery Dennison Corp., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1170, 1182-84 (2004) (Imundo, 
Arb.). 
 200.  Ga.-Pac. Corp., 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 90, 92-93 (1996) (Frost, Arb.). 
 201.  Steelcraft Mfg., 136 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1798, 1801-02 (2016) (Miles, Arb.). 
 202.  Id. 
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medical documentation.203  Even though one employer’s policy requiring 
certain documentation was reasonable, the arbitrator found a lack of just 
cause based on the specific circumstances regarding his access to medical 
care and the employer’s failure to give him a date certain when 
documentation would be necessary to avoid discharge.204  The award 
reinstated the grievant effective the date he was able to return to work.  But 
where a grievant has clearly failed to follow the requisite procedures related 
to use of leave, a just cause protection in a CBA will not save him.205  These 
employees likely would have failed to succeed in a similar claim under the 
ADA or FMLA because their failure to adhere to procedural requirements 
would have constituted legitimate reasons for their discharges. 
In line with these more employee-beneficial awards, several arbitrators 
have sustained grievances of employees seeking a transfer as an 
accommodation under contractual rights to seek such a transfer.206  For 
example, an employer was required to reinstate an employee whose 
impairment prevented the performance of his normal duties because the CBA 
allowed for termination of the seniority of an employee out on injury after 
36 months.207  The arbitrator concluded that the same period of time should 
apply to the employer’s contractual obligation to provide light duty work.208 
Contractual obligations can also help to sustain a grievance, albeit not 
for a lack of just cause.  For example, an arbitrator sustained the grievance 
of an employee whose partial incapacity prevented his performance of his 
previous position because the employer failed to justify its refusal to place 
him in another position under a CBA provision requiring “retrogression.”209  
 
 203.  Employer[Ohio] & UFCW, 200581-AAA, 136 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1841 (2016) 
(Goldberg, Arb.); Interstate Brands Corp., 128 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 428, 431 (2010) 
(Fitzsimmons, Arb.). 
 204.  Employer[Ohio] & UFCW, 200581-AAA, 136 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1847.  But 
see Citgo, 133 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 114, 132-33 (2014) (Jennings, Arb.) (finding just cause 
for discharging employee who failed to provide medical documentation regarding his ability 
to return to work). 
 205.  Whirlpool Corp., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1569, 1573 (2006) (Petersen, Arb.) 
(finding no reason for employee’s failure to follow process). 
 206.  S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 140, 145 (2000) (Riker, Arb.); 
L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 112 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 733, 739-40 (1999) (Kaufman, Arb.) 
(approving transfer to a position occupied by part time employee); Johns Hopkins Bayview 
Med. Ctr., 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 193, 198 (1995) (Bowers, Arb.) (explaining that 
reassignment for on-the-job training would have been reasonable accommodation in lieu of 
discharge); Kenai Borough Emps. Assoc., 1995 LA Supp. 116269 (1995) (Landau, Arb.); 
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1039, 1044 (1993) (Lipson, 
Arb.) (deciding employee to be placed at “any work he can do”). 
 207.  Tecumseh Box Co., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 94 (1999) (Duff, Arb.). 
 208.  Id. at 96. 
 209.  Penelec First Energy Co., 133 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1238 (2014) (Miles, Arb.); see 
also Techneglass, Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 727-28 (explaining that CBA required 
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The arbitrator did not treat this situation as a discharge for cause, but instead 
analyzed the employer’s contractual obligation to continue the employment 
of anyone who is partially incapacitated and for whom a vacancy does not 
exist.210  This grievant clearly benefitted not from just cause protection, but 
from specific contractual language which had been applied to other 
employees in the past.211  Of note is one arbitrator’s comment that the 
contractual requirement to find suitable work for an employee whose 
disability prevents performance of his previous duties was a “broader 
obligation” than required by the ADA.212 
The weakness of arbitration as a means to advance the rights of 
employees with disabilities arises when the employee cannot rely on any 
contractual language to support her request for an accommodation which 
would have prevented the discharge.  For example, where a CBA does not 
require transfer, arbitrators often dismiss grievances on behalf of employees 
who are no longer able to perform their work, without requiring that the 
employer consider a transfer as an accommodation.213  In one case, the 
arbitrator allowed the employer to justify her discharge because the 
employee could no longer perform the essential duties of her previous 
position, but failed to require that the employer consider a transfer before 
discharging for just cause.214  Similarly, a second arbitrator relied on the 
ADA’s limitation on the duty to transfer to vacant positions215 to conclude 
that an employer was not obligated to bump employees with less seniority 
who held positions that the grievant could perform, where the CBA’s 
seniority provision only applied to layoffs.216  A third arbitrator explained 
that the employer had just cause to discharge an employee who failed to 
return to a position he could no longer perform, despite the existence of a 
“job vacancy request” program, because the grievant had failed to initiate a 
 
placement of employee with impairment “on other work if possible”). 
 210.  Penelec First Energy Co., 133 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1245-46. 
 211.  Id. at 1246-47; see also Warren, Ohio Sheriff’s Office, 128 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 
787, 800 (2010) (Bell, Arb.) (finding grievant entitled to light duty assignment under the 
CBA). 
 212.  Techneglass, 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 728. 
 213.  U.S. Steel Corp., 134 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1759, 1766 (2015) (Das, Arb.); 
Parkersburg Bedding, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1788, 1792 (2003) (Zobrak, Arb.). 
 214.  Jefferson-Smurfit Corp., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 1048. 
 215.  See, e.g., White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 362 (10th Cir. 1995) (explaining 
that the ADA does not require an employer to promote, reassign, or create a new position for 
a disabled employee). 
 216.  Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 545, 555-56 (1997) 
(Weckstein, Arb.); see also Henkel Corp., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1121, 1126 (1998) 
(West, Arb.) (requiring a transfer in violation of the seniority rights of others could impose 
undue hardship). 
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request for a transfer as required by the CBA.217  The arbitrator dismissed 
any implication that the employer was responsible for initiating a transfer as 
an accommodation,218 in contrast to some ADA decisions which place some 
obligation on the employer to provide access to transfers as an 
accommodation if the employer is aware that the employee with a disability 
can no longer perform the duties of his previous position.219 
Some arbitrators do not reach the question of a statutory duty to 
accommodate where the employee has been discharged or kept on leave 
based on an inability to perform the duties of her previous position.  For 
example, an arbitrator dismissed the grievance of a Red Cross employee who 
could no longer work around certain equipment, where the CBA included no 
duty to accommodate by transferring her to another position.220  At the same 
time, the arbitrator noted that the employer still had “an obligation to act 
reasonably and to afford a work accommodation if this can be accomplished 
within the Collective Bargaining Agreement and with the past practice of the 
parties.”221 
Similarly, an employer had just cause to discharge an employee after 
disability leave of 24 months (provided under the CBA), without considering 
him for a transfer to a position he could perform, because the CBA did not 
“demand” such a transfer, without any consideration of the ADA’s duty to 
accommodate.222  It is interesting to note that a transfer to a position outside 
of its bargaining unit could be viewed as an unreasonable accommodation.  
One arbitrator failed to support a union’s argument to this effect,223 and a 
second determined that such a transfer would be a reasonable 
accommodation because the grievant could perform the duties.224 
These awards demonstrate that where the CBA limits the authority of 
the arbitrator to an interpretation of the CBA, an arbitrator may rely on 
general principles to resolve the dispute.  Where a specific contract provision 
applies to an employee’s conduct, however, the arbitrator is likely to apply 
that provision without consideration of any additional rights available under 
the ADA.  While this approach might appear to undermine employees’ rights 
under the ADA, the outcome is consistent with ADA decisions which deny 
accommodations based on deference to an employer’s policies, such as a 
seniority system which can override a request for a transfer as an 
 
 217.  AT&T Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 275, 276-77, 281 (2015) 
(Nicholas, Arb.). 
 218.  Id. at 281. 
 219.  Hickox, supra note 170, at 206-10. 
 220.  Am. Red Cross, 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1441, 1445 (2006) (McDonald, Arb.). 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Safeway Corp., 2008 Lab. Arb. Rep. Supp. (BNA) 119039 (2008) (Wages, Arb.). 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Maint. & Indus. Servs., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 293, 299 (2001) (Hart, Arb.). 
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accommodation225 or an employer’s leave policies.226 
3. Employer’s Interests 
Even if a CBA or employer policy does not specifically address an 
employer’s interests in discharging an employee, the second principle of just 
analysis asks whether the company’s rule or managerial order is reasonably 
related to (a) the orderly, efficient, and safe operation of the company’s 
business and (b) the performance that the company might properly expect of 
the employee.227  This approach allows an arbitrator to consider an 
employer’s overall best interests in reviewing a discharge, even if the 
employee has not violated a specific policy of provision of a CBA. 
One could argue that if the prohibition has not been adopted in policy 
or negotiated as part of a CBA, then an employer should not benefit from 
such a general presumption in its favor.  But one can also argue that this 
general recognition of employers’ interests is balanced by the countervailing 
recognition of mitigating circumstances which can result in the reversal of 
an employee’s discharge, as discussed in the following section. 
Issues of ability to perform often raise the question of what 
accommodations are reasonable or required by contract.  For example, a 
hospital was not required to accommodate one employee by using a different 
disinfectant because of the potential adverse effects on other employees and 
patients, as well as ease of use and overall cost.228  It should be noted that 
findings of just cause based on the duties of the position may be inconsistent 
with the ADA’s obligation to remove unessential job duties229 or transfer into 
a vacant position as reasonable accommodations, discussed below.230 
Arbitrators commonly uphold an employer’s determination that an 
employee can no longer perform her job duties, and that removal of those 
duties should not be required.231  Experts have noted that an arbitrator 
balances the right of an employee with a disability to work and “the 
employer’s right to manage the business efficiently.”232  An employer is not 
required under the ADA to remove essential job duties from a position, or 
 
 225.  U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406 (2002).  
 226.  Hickox & Guzman, supra note 182, at 467-70. 
 227.  Enter. Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 363. 
 228.  S. Peninsula Hosp., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 673, 679-80 (2004) (Landau, Arb.). 
 229.  See, e.g., Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding 
that a firefighter’s fire suppression duties were not essential for all other positions in the fire 
department). 
 230.  Hickox, supra note 170, at 197-200. 
 231.  KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 425-26. 
 232.  Id. at 426. 
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assign another person to perform those duties as an accommodation.233  
Relying on both regulations and case law under the ADA, an arbitrator 
refused to require that Bowater remove duties involving certain tools which 
the grievant could not use, because removal of essential duties is not required 
under the ADA.234 
On the question of reasonableness and undue hardship, the employer’s 
temporary reassignment of essential duties does not establish that such a 
reassignment is a reasonable accommodation under the ADA,235 because 
employers should not be “punished” by requiring as accommodation some 
change that it undertook voluntarily.236  The Bowater arbitrator relied on such 
reasoning to find that the employer had just cause to discharge the employee 
who had been excused from performing certain essential duties on a 
temporary basis.237 
Arbitrators have declined to require removal of essential duties even 
without relying on the ADA.  For example, an employer demonstrated just 
cause to discharge an employee with a lifting restriction who could not 
performed regularly assigned duties without assistance, despite his argument 
that the lifting duties were “few and infrequent.”238  Instead, the arbitrator 
accepted without question the employer’s position that lifting was an 
essential part of that position, particularly where the grievant was offered 
 
 233.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2016); see, e.g., Basith v. Cook Cty., 241 F.3d 919, 929 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (holding that the employer did not discriminate against the grievant by not 
assigning essential job functions to other employees); Frazier v. Simmons, 254 F.3d 1247, 
1260 (10th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the mere fact others could do an employee’s work 
does not show that work is nonessential); Smith v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 102 
F.3d 1075, 1076 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that an accommodation eliminating the essential 
functions of a job is not reasonable); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1124 (10th Cir. 
1995) (finding that the employer was not required to reallocate job duties so as to change the 
content, nature, or functions of the job). 
 234.  Bowater, 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 382, 386-87 (2001) (Harris, Arb.); see also 
Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 555 (holding that an engineer’s 
essential job functions, requiring kneeling, bending, and lifting, did not need to be adjusted 
by the employer). 
 235.  See Lucas v. W. W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that the employer was not required to reassign employee to another position to reasonably 
accommodate the employee’s injury); see also Terrell v. U.S. Air, 132 F.3d 621, 625 (11th 
Cir. 1998) (finding that the employer had no duty to create light duty positions to 
accommodate an employee’s disability). 
 236.  See Basith, 241 F.3d at 929-30 (citing Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 
44 F.3d 538, 545 (7th Cir. 1995)) (holding that employers must not be punished for 
accommodations); see also Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 
1997) (observing that employers should not be discouraged from doing more than ADA 
requires). 
 237.  Bowater, 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 389. 
 238.  Maint. & Indus. Servs., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 298. 
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help with lifting in another position.239  The arbitrator also concluded that 
“redesign[ing]” positions was not a reasonable accommodation.240 
Arbitrators have likewise recognized general employer interests in 
addressing the claims of employees who were discharged because they posed 
a threat in the workplace.  One arbitrator, for example, concluded that an 
employer had just cause for the discharge of an employee who only 
threatened to become violent, reasoning that “[n]o employer is required to 
wait until the level of violence is reached,” because “the co-workers’ quality 
of life was seriously impacted as was the productivity of the plant.”241 
Arbitrators have been criticized in their responses to employees who 
engage in workplace violence, under the reasoning that employers should 
have the right to decide that they will not tolerate any threatening or violent 
employee behavior in the workplace.242  Just cause analysis can be applied 
to undermine discipline for violence if committed as an act of self-defense, 
the grievant lacked knowledge of employers’ policies which prohibited his 
behavior, or the subsequent investigation was flawed.243  Consequently, 
some grievants with disabilities may benefit from careful just cause analysis 
despite an employer’s assertion that she poses a threat.  For example, one 
employer lacked just cause to discharge an employee who repeatedly 
contacted a coworker outside of work after a psychotic break.244  Relying 
heavily on the need for nexus between the conduct and the work to rely on 
off duty conduct as the basis for discharge, the employer failed to establish 
that the grievant’s actions had any effect on the employer.245  The arbitrator 
explained that “[m]ere surmise, conjecture or speculation as to the adverse 
effect upon its operations or its business because of the nature per se of the 
 
 239.  Id. at 299. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  See Anchor Hocking, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 319-20 (holding that an 
employer’s discharge of a schizophrenic employee who threatened co-workers did not violate 
the ADA); see also E.B. Eddy Paper, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1821, 1824 (2006) (Allen, 
Arb.) (finding employer had just cause to discharge employee who told the supervisor “I wish 
I had a gun with unlimited bullets to start dropping people one by one.”); Anchorage Sch. 
Dist., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1313, 1320-21 (2004) (DiFalco, Arb.) (upholding the 
discharge of a grievant who was a “time bomb” ready to go off after threatening to kill others); 
San Diego Trolley, 112 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 323, 327 (1999) (Prayzich, Arb.) (holding that 
the employer had just cause to discharge grievant who possessed a gun in his locker in 
violation of a no weapons rule to protect safety of employees). 
 242.  See Daniel V. Johns, Action Should Follow Words: Assessing the Arbitral Response 
to Zero-Tolerance Workplace Violence Policies, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 263, 264-65 
(2009) (arguing that an employer’s zero-tolerance workplace violence policy should be given 
deference by arbitrators to address the serious issue of workplace violence). 
 243.  Id. at 271-72, 274, 279. 
 244.  Chevron Prods. Co., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 649, 652 (2015) (Riker, Arb.). 
 245.  Id. 
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alleged misconduct, is insufficient” to establish just cause.246 
Arbitrators show some inclination to require actual harm to justify the 
discharge of an employee with a disability.  For example, an employer lacked 
just cause to discharge an employee with paranoid schizophrenia who had 
told his psychiatrist that he had thoughts of hurting people at work, but never 
threatened anyone at work in his twelve years of service there.247  The 
arbitrator reinstated the employee and allowed him to remain on leave until 
the time that a medical professional determined it was safe for him to return 
to work.248  Similarly, Walt Disney World lacked just cause to discharge an 
employee for threatening a co-worker via voice-mail under its zero tolerance 
policy, where mitigating circumstances were not considered.249 
Arbitrators will also respect the resolution of previous incidents of 
discipline which the employer has negotiated to its future advantage.  For 
example, an arbitrator enforced a last chance agreement when an employee 
with a disability reported to work two hours late when she overslept because 
of her prescribed medication.250  The arbitrator concluded that the grievant 
need not be offered the opportunity to use vacation time to cover the absence, 
where she had not formally requested an accommodation related to her 
previous absences that had resulted in the last chance agreement, even 
though use of her vacation time would have been an excused absence.251  The 
arbitrator concluded that, where a last chance agreement is in place, the only 
question is whether the grievant violated that agreement.252 
These decisions demonstrate that while some arbitrators may recognize 
some broader employer interests in applying just cause principles, the 
employer may still need to establish some logical or concrete basis for its 
discharge of a particular grievant.  These outcomes may reflect the 
underlying burden on the employer to establish just cause, even where some 
broad employer interest may support its decision to discharge. 
 
 246.  Id. (citing KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 149); see also City of Indianapolis, 118 
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 357, 362 (2003) (Kohn, Arb.) (holding that the employer lacked just 
cause to discharge the grievant based on an anonymous phone call accusing the employee of 
smoking marijuana in a city vehicle because, in part, “mere suspicion is not enough to justify 
a discharge”). 
 247.  Save Mart Supermarkets, 126 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1018, 1022 (2009) (Riker, 
Arb.). 
 248.  Id.  
 249.  Walt Disney World, 127 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 354-55. 
 250.  Mylan Pharm., Inc., 136 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 895, 899 (2016) (Miles, Arb.). 
 251.  Id. at 903-04.  
 252.  Id. at 904. 
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4. Mitigating Circumstances 
Arbitrators typically consider a variety of mitigating factors related to 
the individual grievant when considering whether the employer’s decision to 
discharge was justified.253  In claims by employees with disabilities, 
mitigating factors can include the person’s disability, which may have 
contributed to the behavior that provided the reason for the discharge.  
Related to the person’s disability, an arbitrator may consider the potential for 
improvement in the employee’s condition or progress in rehabilitation.  In 
addition, arbitrators consider other individual factors which mitigate against 
the employee’s discharge, such as longevity and a good performance record.  
This consideration of the surrounding circumstances and the positive 
characteristics of the employee with a disability contrasts starkly with ADA 
analysis, which only considers whether the employee was otherwise 
qualified for the position or provided the employer with a legitimate reason 
for the discharge.254 
An individual grievant’s past performance often results in a finding that 
an employer lacked just cause for a discharge.  Insubordination, while a 
common reason for discharge, may not be sufficient to justify a discharge, 
particularly where the grievant had no prior misconduct over a long tenure 
with the employer, and the conduct was related to an illness or impairment.255  
For example, a grocery store failed to show just cause to discharge a bagger 
with bipolar disorder who was accused of using profanity toward his 
manager256  The discharge was not fair and reasonable under the “proper 
cause” clause of the CBA, based on the grievant’s potential for rehabilitation, 
his 14 years of employment there, and the absence of any threat to safety of 
employees or customers.257 
Mitigating measures also may be considered in determining whether an 
employer had just cause to discharge an employee based on his inability to 
meet performance expectations.  For example, repeated errors justified the 
suspension, but not the discharge, of a grievant with a long job tenure who 
suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder related to his military service 
and was the victim of workplace harassment.258  Similarly, an employer 
lacked good cause to discharge a 20-year employee whose performance 
issues were caused at least in part by a lack of training and his impairment 
 
 253.  KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 496-500. 
 254.  See, e.g., Newell v. Alden Vill. Health Facility for Children & Young Adults, 651 
F.App’x. 556, 559 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that plaintiff was not qualified to perform essential 
job duties because she could not perform the essential functions of the position). 
 255.   Polar Tank Trailer, 130 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 406, 410 (2012) (Fitzsimmons, Arb.). 
 256.  Schnucks Mkts., 131 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1087 (2012) (Gear, Arb.). 
 257.  Id. at 1089-90. 
 258.  Lafarge Corp., 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1188, 1192 (2000) (Liebowitz, Arb.). 
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that warranted his assignment to light duty.259 
An employee with health issues may benefit from mitigating 
circumstances even where that employee has engaged in some misconduct.  
For example, three different employers lacked just cause to discharge 
employees who unintentionally fell asleep on the job.260  The first arbitrator 
relied on a finding of no just cause in favor of another grievant who fell 
asleep on the job when suffering from anxiety attacks.261  One arbitrator 
considered the grievant’s record of very little past discipline over thirty-one 
years with the employer,262 while another considered the grievant’s eighteen 
years without discipline and the post-discharge diagnosis connected to 
falling asleep.263 
Similarly, arbitrators will sometimes consider mitigating factors to 
conclude that the employer lacked just cause for a discharge based on 
attendance.  One arbitrator opined that the justification for discharging an 
employee after some period of leave depended upon several factors, 
including his tenure, whether the leave was caused by a workplace injury or 
illness, the “cost of the employee’s absence . . . to the employer (in terms of 
dollars and efficiency),” as well as the past and anticipated length of the 
absence.264  Under these criteria, the arbitrator reinstated the grievant with an 
opportunity to establish his ability to work within four weeks, based on his 
twenty-two years of service and overall good performance.265 
A disability may be viewed as a mitigating factor for a grievant who 
engages in misconduct, such as two different grievants with depression who 
were given the opportunity for reinstatement despite becoming violent with 
coworkers,266 a grievant who could not be terminated for insubordinate 
 
 259.  Johnson Controls Battery Grp., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 769, 773-74 (1999) 
(Cantor, Arb.). 
 260.  Ga. Power Co., 129 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 481, 491-93 (Smith, Arb. 2010); Union 
Tank Car Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1473 (2007) (Dilts, Arb.); Sponge Cushion, Inc., 
114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 467, 470-471 (2000) (Gordinier, Arb.); see also, U.S. Foodservice, 
120 Lab. Arb. Rep.  (BNA) 737 (2004) (Scholtz, Arb.) (finding a lack of just cause to 
discharge based on DUI while on leave). 
 261.  Sponge Cushion, Inc., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 470-471. 
 262.  Georgia Power Co., 129 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 491-93.   
 263.  Union Tank Car Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1477-78 (modifying discharge to 
suspension without pay for nine and one-half months); see also SMG, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. 
(BNA) 1239, 1242 (2003) (Goldberg, Arb.) (reinstating grievant without back pay based on 
medical condition contributing to misconduct, citing his long and successful tenure); Health 
Plus Inc., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 618, 621 (1998) (Duff, Arb.) (finding no just cause to 
suspend employee of twenty-three years based on taking break related to impairment). 
 264.  148860-AAA, Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp. 148860 (2012) (Grossman, Arb.); see 
also Hous. Auth. of Louisville, 111 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 124 (finding no duty to keep 
position open indefinitely under “arbitral law”). 
 265.  148860-AAA, supra note 262. 
 266.  Am. Nat’l Can Co., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 289, 292 (1995) (Giblin, Arb.) 
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behavior because behavior was due to depression,267 and the grievant whose 
threat to take unjustified medical leave was “probably” a manifestation of 
her mental illness.268  Similarly, a grievant’s undiagnosed herniated disc was 
treated as a mitigating factor to reduce his discharge to a thirty day 
suspension based on some unsafe behavior and his use of profanity at 
work.269  The arbitrator recognized that pain can cause “temporary 
personality changes” and that the employer’s failure to refer the grievant for 
a medical examination before the incident was at least a partial cause of the 
outburst.270 
Similarly, three different employers lacked just cause to discharge 
employees for absenteeism which was directly linked to their mental 
illnesses, based on medical evidence presented to establish the connection 
between the impairments and the absences.271  Some arbitrators may even 
accept evidence from non-medical sources to justify a grievant’s absence.272  
As with one’s inability to perform job duties, an impairment may only be a 
mitigating factor with regard to absenteeism if the employer has knowledge 
of it before imposing discipline.273 
Just cause analysis can likewise benefit an employee discharged for 
tardiness or absenteeism.274  Recognizing an employer’s right to discharge 
for failure to meet essential job duties, including regular attendance, one 
 
(highlighting that employer lacked all the facts); Bethlehem Structural Prods. Corp., 106 Lab. 
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 452, 455-56 (1995) (Witt, Arb.) (finding that the assault was the result of 
grievant’s depression). 
 267.  Laidlaw Transit Inc., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 305-06 (finding that employee 
who was not warned he must continue treatment for depression to stay employed cannot be 
terminated for insubordinate behavior due to his untreated disability). 
 268.  Carrier Corp., 134 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 308, 311-12 (2014) (Heekin, Arb.). 
 269.  Gaylord Container Corp., 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 431, 435 (1996) (Henner, 
Arb.). 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Interstate Power & Light Co., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 307, 311 (2005) (Daly, 
Arb.); LTV Steel Mining Co., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 283, 288 (1997) (Doepken, Arb.) 
(finding no just cause to discharge grievant on last chance agreement where absenteeism was 
due to change in medication, and ordering grievant’s return to active employment “upon 
presentation of satisfactory evidence that he is medically fit to return to work”); USS, 104 
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 82, 85-86 (1994) (Dybeck, Arb.) (finding no just cause for discharge 
where grievant missed work to attend appointment with psychologist, despite last chance 
agreement). 
 272.  Cumberland Coal, 136 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 988, 993-94 (2016) (Miles, Arb.) 
(citing prior arbitration awards). 
 273.  OmniSource Corp., 129 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 818, 821 (2011) (Coyne, Arb.). 
 274.  See, e.g., Kautex Textron, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 746, 749 (2007) (Brunner, 
Arb.) (finding that employer lacked just cause where attendance didn’t justify discharge under 
employer’s policy); Am. Airlines, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 545 (2005) (Abrams, Arb.) 
(finding that grievant’s illness undercut finding that grievant was either unwilling or unable 
to meet attendance obligations). 
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arbitrator found a lack of just cause under a requirement that the employee 
must be either unwilling or unable to meet attendance obligations in the 
future.275  Thus, absences related to the symptoms of an employee’s medical 
impairment may not show just cause.276 
Conversely, arbitrators may consider but are not necessarily persuaded 
by a grievant’s illness or injury as a mitigating factor, such as the grievant 
whose illness was aggravated by the stress he encountered at work on the 
day he left without permission.277  Likewise, the personality disorders which 
admittedly contributed to the misconduct of three different grievants’ 
misconduct at work did not undermine the employers’ just cause for 
discharging them.278  One of those arbitrators explained that “[a]n employer 
is not required to keep in its employ a worker who is so disabled as to 
demonstrate incapacity to consistently carry out required job.”279 
A disability also may not be a mitigating factor if it is not linked to the 
grievant’s misconduct.  For example, an arbitrator considered but was not 
persuaded by a grievant’s disability in finding just cause for her discharge 
because her use of racially offensive terms in an e-mail was not a 
“spontaneous outburst” associated with her bi-polar disorder, particularly 
where she had been warned against engaging in such behavior.280  A grievant 
may be limited in relying on an impairment as a mitigating factor if the 
employer was not so informed prior to imposing the discipline.281 
Arbitrators also have the flexibility to consider mitigating factors 
related to an employee’s misconduct, even if those facts were unknown to 
the employer at the time of the discharge.  For example, the arbitrator for the 
grievance of an employee who experienced a psychotic break considered his 
mental state as a mitigating factor, and concluded that “[i]f a full 
investigation had been undertaken by the Employer this matter may well 
have enlightened management of the fact that the Grievant was a tormented 
human being who needed help.”282  The grievant was reinstated but under a 
 
 275.  Am. Airlines, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 549. 
 276.  Id. at 550. 
 277.  NAES Corp., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 1709. 
 278.  Beckett Paper Co., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1139; Nat’l Linen Supply, 107 Lab. 
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 4, 9 (1996) (Ross, Arb.); Rohm & Haas, 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 974, 
977-78 (1995) (Koenig, Arb.). 
 279.  Nat’l Linen Supply, 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 9. 
 280.  M T Detroit, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1777, 1782 (2003) (Allen, Arb.). 
 281.  Monongalia Cty. Coal Co., 136 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 135. 
 282.  Chevron Prods. Co., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 653 (citing Elkouri & Elkouri, 
supra note 42, at 814-15); see also Growmark Inc., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 785, 788 
(1993) (Ver Ploeg, Arb.) (holding that grievant’s hospitalization for psychiatric counseling 
explained failure to request leave); Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, 98 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 112, 
116 (1991) (Madden, Arb.) (finding no just cause where grievant could not perform duties 
because of his health); Norman Brand & Melissa Biren, DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN 
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last chance agreement with several conditions to guard against any further 
inappropriate contact with the coworker.283 
In contrast to these awards in which a grievant’s disability may work in 
her favor to disprove just cause, a court reviewing an ADA challenge to a 
discharge will limit its analysis to whether the employer had a legitimate 
reason for the discharge and whether that reason was a pretext for 
discrimination.284  This requires a plaintiff to present evidence which 
contradicts the facts relied upon by the employer,285 and to avoid a motion 
for summary judgment, the court must find that a reasonable jury could 
disbelieve the employer’s articulated non-discriminatory reason.286  
Nowhere in this analysis does the court require that an employer consider 
other circumstances or characteristics of the employee that would weigh 
against the decision to discharge.  Instead, courts have consistently refused 
to act as “super-personnel departments” to prevent employers from 
discharging people with disabilities even for reasons related to their 
disability.287 
Grievants who allegedly pose a direct threat also benefit in arbitration 
from evidence of a lessening of the symptoms of their impairment or 
rehabilitation following their discharge.  Experts have noted that 
rehabilitation can be a persuasive, if not determinative, factor mitigating 
against discharge as the appropriate response to the conduct of an employee 
with a disability.288  For example, a grievant with a mental illness was 
reinstated, despite her employer’s claims that she posed a direct threat, where 
her behavior improved substantially, due to successful therapy, after 
discharge. 289  That arbitrator noted “numerous” awards, some preceding the 
passage of the ADA, in which arbitrators considered the post-discharge 
improvement of the grievant’s mental state as a mitigating factor in favor of 
awarding reinstatement.290  As a condition of her reinstatement on a 
 
ARBITRATION (BNA, 2nd ed. 2008). 
 283.  Chevron Prods. Co., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 654. 
 284.  See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (finding that once 
the employer had supplied legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for demotion and discharge, 
the presumption of discrimination had been rebutted and the burden shifted to the employee 
to ultimately prove that reasoning was pretext for discrimination); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 
759, 763-64 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that employee had failed to show that both the employer’s 
given reasons for non-discriminatory action were untrue and that discrimination was true 
reason behind action). 
 285.  Tomasso v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702, 706 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 286.  Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 430 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 287.  Ramona L. Paetzold, How Courts, Employers, and the ADA Disable Persons with 
Bipolar Disorder, 9 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 293, 373-374 (2005). 
 288.  KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 424-25. 
 289.  AAFES Distribution, 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 290, 296 (1996) (Marcus, Arb.). 
 290.  Id. (citing USS, 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 82; Meijer, Inc., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. 
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probationary basis, the grievant was ordered to continue with her treatment 
and agree to a release of her treatment records to the employer.291  In contrast, 
a grievant’s failure to demonstrate rehabilitation may undermine his 
grievance.  For example, an arbitrator refused to reinstate an employee 
discharged for alcoholism, in part because the employee had failed to 
continue with regular counseling and took a job as a bartender after his 
discharge.292 
Arbitrators have also been criticized for considering other mitigating 
factors when determining whether a grievant posed a direct threat in the 
workplace.293  For example, an employee who had slapped a coworker was 
reinstated based on his supervisor’s provision of a positive reference letter 
and a request that he work extra hours after the incident took place.294 
Decisions under the ADA concerning whether an employee poses a 
direct threat only consider whether the employer reasonably believed that the 
plaintiff posed a direct threat in the workplace at the time of the discharge; 
proof of an actual threat is unnecessary.295  An employee will only survive a 
motion for summary judgment if he can produce evidence that raises 
questions of fact as to whether he posed a threat at the time of the 
discharge.296  In contrast, arbitrators often consider subsequent facts or 
circumstances that might undermine the employer’s determination that the 
employee did pose a direct threat. 
5. Flexibility in Remedies 
A significant difference between arbitration and litigation under the 
ADA is the availability of a variety of remedies.  Arbitrators typically follow 
 
(BNA) 834; Duquesne Light Co., 90 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 696 (1988) (Probst, Arb.); UC 
Agric. Prods. Co., Inc., 89 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 432 (1987) (Anderson, Arb.)). 
 291.  Id. at 297. 
 292.  Keystone Steel & Wire Co. 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1466, 1472 (2000) 
(Goldstein, Arb.); see also Packaging Corp. of Am., 105 Lab. Arb. Rep.  (BNA) 591, 594-95 
(1995) (Hewitt, Arb.) (finding that an employee with delayed stress reaction could not 
establish that the problem that caused misconduct was corrected). 
 293.  Johns, supra note 240, at 280-81. 
 294.  Sodexho Mgmt., Inc., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1643, 1647-48 (2007) (Kaufman, 
Arb.). 
 295.  See, e.g., Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that an 
employer reasonably believed there was a direct threat posed by an employee with worsening 
symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder given the nature and severity of the potential 
risk, the likelihood that the potential harm would occur, and the imminence of the potential 
harm).  
 296.  See, e.g., McFadden v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 204 F. Supp. 3d 134, 145-
47 (D.D.C. 2016) (explaining the procedural standard for responding to a motion for summary 
judgment). 
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the tenet that one should not substitute his judgment regarding discipline for 
that of management unless the penalty of discharge was excessive, 
unreasonable or that management abused its discretion.297  At the same time, 
if an employer’s policy does not go further and state which circumstances 
might justify discipline less than a discharge, or even no discipline, an 
arbitrator must apply common sense, past practice, company and industry 
standards, and societal standards to determine whether and to what extent a 
particular disciplinary decision is justified.298 
The penalty imposed by an arbitrator can depend on the employer’s past 
practice, including the discharge of the grievant as compared to how the 
employer has previously punished other employees.299  In one study of over 
2,000 discipline and discharge arbitration awards between 1982 and 2005, 
almost 30% were classified as “split decisions,” including reinstatement with 
partial or no back pay, or entitlement to a future vacancy.300  Four hundred 
and fifty-four awards reduced the level of discipline under just cause 
analysis, based on one or more mitigating factors.301  The most common 
mitigating factors relied upon were the punishment being too severe for the 
offense, a good work record, a lack of progressive discipline, and length of 
service.302 
Under the limited judicial review of arbitration awards discussed 
earlier, an arbitrator is free to reduce the punishment imposed, despite some 
violation of a clear employer policy, if employees were not previously aware 
that discharge could result from a violation of that policy.303  As one court 
explained, “the general practice among arbitrators is to consider just cause 
when assessing the degree of discipline imposed.”304  This support for finding 
an implied just cause requirement extends to the degree of discipline 
imposed by the employer.305 
Reinstatement without full back pay is common where the grievant is 
somehow deemed to be “at fault” even though the employer lacked just cause 
for discharge.306  For example, an employer lacked just cause to discharge an 
 
 297.  Franz Food Prods., 28 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 543, 548 (1953) (Bothwell, Arb.). 
 298.  ST. ANTOINE, supra note 37, at 185. 
 299.  KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 20. 
 300.  Cooper, supra note 92, at 429. 
 301.  Id. at 420. 
   302.    Id. at 420. 
 303.  See, e.g., Gloucester Terminals, LLC v. Teamsters Local Union 929, No. 16-5322, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77486 at *13-19 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2017). 
 304.  SFIC Props., 103 F.3d at 925. 
 305.  Charter Commc’s, LLC v. Int’l Bro. of Elec. Workers, 602 F.App’x 654, 655 (9th 
Cir. 2015). 
 306.  See, e.g., Hilltop Basic Res., 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 861, 864-65 (1993) (Krislov, 
Arb.) (holding that grievant’s suspension was justified in part by his failure to obtain 
physician’s certificate allowing return to work). 
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employee who fell asleep during his paid break, but the arbitrator still denied 
back pay because the grievant had failed to get treatment for his condition 
which led to the incident.307 
Similarly, a Meijer cashier was reinstated to a position without 
customer contact after making rude statements to a customer, which were 
attributed to his bipolar disorder.308  Although the mental illness did 
contribute to the misconduct, the arbitrator found some cause for discipline 
because the grievant’s failure to seek treatment caused the misconduct, and 
that failure could not have been accommodated.  This conclusion failed to 
consider a potential duty to provide leave as an accommodation under the 
ADA, as the union had suggested.  Even so, the arbitrator reinstated the 
grievant (without back pay) based on his determination that the penalty of 
discharge was inappropriate, given the employer’s knowledge of the 
disability and the relationship between the disability and the misconduct, as 
well as his long years of service.309  Thus, in essence, the award provided the 
employee with a period of unpaid leave as a quasi-accommodation for the 
period of time in which he failed to seek treatment.  This outcome likely 
placed the employee in a better position than he would have been in under 
the ADA, since his failure to receive treatment likely would have rendered 
him unqualified at the time of the discharge,310 thereby undermining the 
ADA claim. 
Unlike courts, arbitrators can dictate prospective relief that can result in 
the grievant’s reinstatement while still addressing employers’ concerns.  For 
example, one arbitrator reinstated an employee with bipolar disorder who 
had engaged in misconduct, but imposed a suspension without pay until the 
employee met certain conditions indicating his readiness to return to work 
with his behavior under control.311  Similarly, employers of grievants with 
mental illnesses have been allowed by the arbitrator to condition future 
employment on receipt of treatment and/or the taking of medication (which 
in one case was found to have contributed to alleged insubordination).312  
Similarly, an award reinstating the grievant still gave the employer the 
opportunity to require assurance from the grievant’s doctor that he was on 
 
 307.  EG & G Mound Applied Techs., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 60, 64 (1993) (Heekin, 
Arb.); see also Hosp. Klean of Tex., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 985, 994 (2004) (Howell, 
Arb.) (denying back pay for grievant who used impairment as excuse to avoid working). 
 308.  Meijer Inc., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 839-40. 
 309.  Id. at 840. 
 310.  See, e.g., Green v. Burton Rubber Processing, Inc., 30 F. App’x 466, 468-70 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (ruling that an employee who left treatment facility after making threats was not 
qualified for position). 
 311.  Schnucks Mkts., 131 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1090-91. 
 312.  Laidlaw Transit Inc., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 306; Gen. Elec. Co., 103 Lab. 
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 214, 218-19 (1994) (Cabe, Arb.). 
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proper medication to control his panic attacks.313  An arbitrator’s flexibility 
likewise is demonstrated by remedies that include requiring an independent, 
neutral medical evaluation of a grievant to determine his ability to meet the 
physical demands of the position in question.314 
Unlike an ADA court, an arbitrator has the flexibility to condition a 
remedy on information only available in the future.  For example, 
reinstatement as a remedy can be conditioned on the results of a future 
medical examination to determine whether the grievant is fit to return to 
work.315  Other arbitrators have ordered the parties to meet and discuss a 
grievant’s ability to return to work, with the availability of future arbitration 
if they are unable to agree.316  One arbitrator explained that the grievant 
should only be returned to work if the parties agreed on a “solid basis on 
which to conclude that his medical condition no longer poses an 
unreasonable risk of harm to others.”317 
An even more extensive remedy was created by an arbitrator upon 
hearing the grievance of a discharged government employee whose assault 
on a coworker was closely connected to the symptoms of his disability.318  In 
addition to converting the discharge to a suspension of no more than ninety 
days with the associated back pay, the award allowed the employer to place 
the grievant on a last chance agreement (despite EEOC concerns regarding 
last chance agreements as accommodations), access his relevant medical 
records and agree to a treatment plan based on the recommendations of the 
grievant’s doctor (including monitoring to ensure adherence to medication 
regimen), as well as reassigning him to a different unit to avoid stressors and 
“for personnel relations reasons.”319 
Like employees who engage in misconduct, a just cause provision may 
benefit a person with a disability who cannot meet her employer’s 
performance expectations.  For example, an employer lacked just cause to 
discharge an employee with diabetes that contributed to his low 
productivity.320  While the performance standards were reasonable and 
 
 313.  Ga. Power Co., 129 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 494; see also Cross Oil Refining Co., 
111 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1013, 1024 (1999) (Bumpass, Arb.) (stating that an employer can 
require either proof of mental and emotional fitness by psychologist or psychiatrist or 
retraining with counselor). 
 314.  Noranda Aluminum, 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 222; see also The Ohio Moulding 
Corp., 1996 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp. 117047 (Klein, Arb.) (explaining that the discharge 
lacks just cause if medical opinion finds that grievant could perform the vacant position). 
 315.  Am. Nat’l Can Co., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 292. 
 316.  Bethlehem Structural Prods. Corp., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 456. 
 317.  Id. at 456. 
 318.  Dept. of Commerce, Patent & Trademark Office, 1999 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp. 
107763 (Moore, Arb.). 
 319.  Id. 
 320.  Sysco Food Servs., 130 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1724 (2012) (Paolucci, Arb.). 
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allowed under the CBA’s management rights clause, the employer should 
have taken the employee’s disability into account in determining what level 
of discipline should have been imposed.321  This arbitrator returned the 
grievant to work with no loss of seniority, but without back pay because of 
“his own culpability” in failing to treat his condition and advise his 
supervisors of his impairment’s impact on his productivity.322  At the same 
time, back pay may be denied for employees who have engaged in some 
misconduct for which the arbitrator finds suspension or some other loss of 
pay to be appropriate.323 
In contrast to these arbitration awards, which provide employees with 
alternatives to discharge, a court reviewing an ADA claim will only 
determine whether or not the discharge constituted discrimination; if not, no 
remedy is awarded.  An arbitrator’s flexibility in considering mitigating 
factors and fashioning remedies for employees with disabilities who have 
been discharged may be the single most important factor in their regaining 
employment.  Such flexibility allows the arbitrator to recognize the interests 
of the employer in imposing some type of discipline, such as a suspension 
without pay, while allowing for the reinstatement of employees whose 
discharge may be the result of an impairment over which she has little control 
or which may not continue to affect performance or behavior in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
This analysis of the benefits of just cause protection for employees with 
disabilities demonstrates that arbitrators, if empowered to do so, can fully 
and fairly resolve claims that would otherwise arise under the ADA.  This 
analysis supports courts’ deference to arbitration as the forum to enforce 
statutory rights as well as contractual rights,324 despite warnings that 
arbitration of statutory claims would result in the evisceration of rights under 
statutes like the ADA.325  Thus, arbitration of just cause claims by employees 
with disabilities shows the viability of arbitration as an alternative venue to 
 
 321.  Id. at 1738. 
 322.  Id. at 1739; see also Walt Disney World, 127 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 357 (allowing 
an employee to be reinstated after alleged threatening of coworker but denying back pay 
because he “did wrong that day”); Am. Airlines, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 550 (2005) 
(reinstating an employee who was absent due to symptoms of impairment but without back 
pay, because he was partially at fault for circumstances including failure to file FMLA 
paperwork); Sherwin-Williams Co., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1192 (reinstating an 
employee who should have been offered transfer as accommodation without back pay, 
pending agreement re: placement). 
 323.  See, e.g., Albertson’s Inc., 1993 LAB. ARB. SUPP. (BNA) 102592 (Sherman, Arb. 
1993) (holding that leave without pay was justified). 
 324.  14 Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at 270-74. 
 325.  Hyde, supra note 5, at 984.   
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resolve discrimination claims.  Grievants with disabilities appear to fare at 
least as well, if not better, compared to analogous claims resolved by the 
courts under the ADA. 
Just cause protection places on the employer the burden of proving 
some legitimate reason for the employee’s discharge, which can carry 
serious advantages for an employee with a disability who may lack access to 
concrete information to support her claim under the ADA.  But beyond the 
burden of proof, arbitration of just cause claims incorporates the requirement 
that an employee be provided with notice of required and prohibited 
behavior, and provides the benefit (or the burden) of an employer’s past 
practice in enforcing such policies.  An employee with a disability can also 
take advantage of other contractual obligations on an employer in deciding 
whether her discharge was justified.  While some courts applying the ADA 
consider related contractual rights, they are not directly obligated to do so. 
Beyond specific contractual requirements, an arbitrator often considers 
mitigating circumstances which can benefit the employee with a disability, 
particularly if those circumstances demonstrate that the employee was not 
“at fault” in her conduct.  An arbitrator’s flexibility in fashioning the 
remedies in an award interpreting a just cause provision can also benefit 
employees with disabilities.  As an alternative to discharge, a suspension 
without pay or even an obligation to provide additional medical information 
may be a welcome outcome. 
Arbitration may not be perfect, and outcomes often depend on the 
authority an arbitrator is given under a collective bargaining agreement.  
Even so, this forum provides an opportunity for employees with disabilities 
to challenge employer assumptions about their value in the workplace.  They 
may gain reinstatement, even in situations which would not result in a similar 
outcome in ADA litigation.  With proper oversight of the arbitration process 
and vigorous representation by the employee’s union or outside counsel, just 
cause protection may be the best route to improving the participation and 
retention of employees with disabilities in the workplace. 
 
